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Prying, Spying, and Lying:
Intrusive Newsgathering and What
the Law Should Do About It
Lyrissa Bamett Lidsky*
The media s use of intrusive newsgathering techniques poses an increasing threat to
individualprivacy. Courts currently resolve the overwhelming majority of conflicts in favor of
the media. This is not because the First Amendment bars the imposition of tort liability on the
media for its newsgathering practices. It does not. Rather, tort law has failed to seize the
opportunity to create meaningful privacy protection. Most torts that affect newsgathering
protect privacy only incidentally, and the tort of intrusion, which addresses newsgathering more
directly, has been interpreted so narrowly that it provides little or no protection from the most
common types of media harassment. More pointedly, tort laws failure to signal what types of
newsgathering are prohibited makes the protection ofprivacy more the result of an economic
calculus than a legal one. Invading privacy can be highly profitable. Wealthier segments of the
media are therefore willing to incur the remote (but significant) risk of legal liability for using
intrusive newsgathering techniques. After surveying the economic, philosophical, and practical
obstacles to reform, this Article proposes to rejuvenate the tort of intrusion to tip the balance
between privacy and the press back in privacyr direction. Working within the framework of
traditional tort law, this Article advocates reform of intrusion doctrinal flaws followed by the
adoption of a "newsgatherer's privilege" to protect media intrusions that serve a significant
public interest. The newsgatherers privilege would bring a degree of predictability to the
resolution of intrusion cases by specifying the various factors relevant to the determination of
whether or not newsgathering has crossed the line into invasion ofprivacy. The privilege would
therefore achieve an appropriate accommodation between privacy and newsgathering without
sacrificing the intrusion tort's adaptability to the various forms ofprying, spying, and lying used
by the media.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. J.D. 1993,
University of Texas School of Law. I wish to thank the following people for their assistance
throughout the writing process: David Anderson, Tom Cotter, Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Nancy
Dowd, Jeff Harrison, Ron Krotoszynski, Elizabeth Lear, Amy Mashbum, Pedro Malavet,
Diane Mazur, Lars Noah, Sharon Rush, Chris Slobogin, and Mary Twitchell. I also
appreciate the helpful comments offered by the faculty members of Florida State University
who attended my presentation of an early draft of this Article. Peter Brown and Eric Dentel
provided excellent research and editorial assistance, for which I am quite grateful.
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"Investigative reporters ... are the guard dogs of society, but the
trouble with guard dogs is that they sometimes attack with equal fervor
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2. See Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Article IV of the Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics). The most recent version
of the Code states, under the heading "Seek Truth and Report It," that "[loumalists should be
honest, fair, and courageous in gathering, reporting and interpreting information." Society of
Prof'1 Journalists, Code of Ethics (last modified Mar. 18, 1998) <http://www.spj.org/
ethics/index.htm>.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prying, spying, and lying are tools of the trade to a significant
portion of today's "gotcha" journalists.' Market pressures require
journalists not just to get the story, but to cast it in a dramatic way.
Journalists therefore resort to a variety of intrusive newsgathering
tools: they adopt false identities and employ hidden cameras, they
hound subjects in the streets and stake out their homes, they trail police
into the homes of crime suspects and crime victims, and they follow
ambulance workers to obtain graphic footage of accident scenes.4
Despite the pejorative description, prying, spying, and lying by
the media sometimes serve the public interest, and context may be all
that separates legitimate newsgathering from unwarranted invasions of
privacy. While exposing serious physical abuse of the elderly justifies
3. See Susan Patemo, The Lying Game, 1997 AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 1997, at
40. Much of the blame for intrusive newsgathering techniques is laid at the feet of the
"tabloid" journalists of both the print and television variety. The problem is not confined to
them, however. The tabloids are increasingly setting the standard of conduct for all segments
of the media. See generally Kenneth R. Clark, Hidden Meanings: Increasing Use of Secret
Cameras and Microphones Raises Ethical Questions About TV Journalism, CHm. TRIB., June
30, 1992, at DI; Christopher Clausen, Culture Watching: Reading the Supermarket Tabloids,
NEW LEADER, Sept. 7, 1992, at 11; David Lamb, Into the Realm of Tabloids, L.A. TmiEs, Feb.
13, 1992, atAl.
4. These examples correspond with the three most common categories of intrusion
claims against the media, which include "surreptitious surveillance, traditional trespass, and
instances where consent to enter into a secluded setting for one purpose has been exceeded
by the invitee." Victor A. Kovner & Harriette K. Dorsen, Recent Developments in Intrusion,
Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, in 3 COMMUNICATIONS LAw 775,
783 (1990). Other examples include relentlessly and obtrusively pursuing a target, see
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973), and threatening to harass a target's
family unless the target gives an interview to the reporter, see Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp.
1413, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a jury could find that Inside Edition reporters
ambushed, harassed, and intruded into the lives of the family of a health care executive in
order to coerce him into giving an interview); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 538
P.2d 804, 806-07 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (discussing plaintiff's allegations that newspaper
editor printed their names and addresses because they would not grant an interview). For
further discussion of the variety of intrusive methods used by the media, see infra Part V.C.
1998]
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donning a false identity and a hidden camera,' the same technique is
questionable when used to uncover phony telepsychics, 6
hypnotherapists,7 a harmless "quack" prescribing herbs to his friends
from his home,8 or the most common "pick-up" lines in a Minneapolis
bar.' Society expects the media to scrutinize its heroes and villains,
but roundly condemns the media when scrutiny crosses the line into
harassment and hounding."° Moreover, the very same event that
justifies coverage when it occurs in a public street may be off limits
when it occurs in a private home."
It is no surprise, therefore, that the law encounters difficulty in
drawing lines between legitimate newsgathering and unwarranted
invasions of privacy. Yet the difficulty of the task does not justify
resolving all conflicts between the two in favor of the media, as the
law currently seems to do. This is not because the United States
Supreme Court has placed insurmountable First Amendment obstacles
in the way of punishing media intrusions: newsgathering, unlike news
dissemination, receives only limited constitutional protection. 2 But
courts seem to place little value on privacy when it comes into conflict
with press freedoms.
This Article explores why constitutional law and tort law have
struggled (and largely failed) to reach an appropriate accommodation
between privacy and press freedoms and ultimately proposes a number
of practical solutions for tipping the balaice in favor of privacy. In
Part 1I, this Article details the rise of intrusive newsgathering methods,
and analyzes the competing-pressures for reform of the current system.
Part HI then demonstrates the doctrinal flaws in both constitutional and
5. See 20/20: Victims of Greed (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1991). For
more extensive discussion of this story, see infra Parts IVC and VC.
6. See Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Media L. Rptr. 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
7. See Eye to Eye with Connie Chung: Spellbound (CBS television broadcast, Dec.
22, 1994).
8. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
9. See Paterno, supra note 3, at 42.
10. The coverage of Princess Diana illustrates the potential conflict in these positions.
According to a WSJ/NBC poll, 56% of respondents thought there was too much coverage of
Princess Diana's death. See generally Jacqueline Sharkey, The Diana Aftermath, 1997 AM.
JouRNALISM REv., Nov. 1997, at 18, 22 (citing poll results). At the same time, newspapers
and magazines reported huge circulation increases in issues with Diana-related news. See id.
11. See infra Part V.C.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. Although this Article examines the constitutional law limiting the imposition of
tort liability for invasions of privacy, it does not deal with the constitutional right of privacy.
Nor does it examine constitutional limits on states' imposition of criminal liability for media
misbehaviors.
[Vol. 73:173
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tort law, which have made the protection of privacy against media
intrusions largely illusory.
Part IV focuses on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. At first
glance, intrusion appears to be the most promising tort remedy for
intrusive newsgathering behaviors.14 A newsgatherer will be liable for
intrusion where she "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns ... [and] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person."'" Unlike other tort remedies, intrusion is aimed
specifically at protecting psychological and spatial privacy and is
designed with newsgathering in mind. 6 Moreover, intrusion appears
to be the only tort theory available that is both capable of surmounting
constitutional obstacles and flexible enough to encompass the wide
variety of means by which the media invade individual privacy. Yet,
as it turns out, intrusion is currently one of the least effective tort
remedies.
This Article argues that intrusion is worth fixing. Both doctrinal
and economic analyses suggest that the uncertain scope of protection
that intrusion gives to newsgathering is bad both for the media and for
the individuals whose privacy they invade. Fixing intrusion is more
difficult than it sounds. Part V illustrates this point by exploring the
philosophical justifications for protecting privacy in a society
committed to candor, openness, and maximizing press freedom. Part
V then identifies the contextual nuances of this area of law that make it
a difficult one in which to draw lines and make a rights-based
approach to privacy impracticable in all but the most egregious cases
of media intrusion.
In light of this analysis, Part VI suggests rejuvenating the tort of
intrusion, first, by fixing the tort's doctrinal flaws to make privacy
protection possible and, second, by crafting a newsgatherer's privilege
14. See discussion infra Part IV. The privacy torts are unique in the sense that they
are largely the creation of law review articles. The privacy torts originated with Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis's, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890), which has
been termed "perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law review article
ever written." Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
203 (1954). Equally influential was Dean Prosser's division of the privacy tort into four
distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion, (2) public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts, (3) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light, and
(4) commercial exploitation of the plaintiff's name or likeness. See William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Dean Prosser's categorization scheme is integral
to discussion of privacy issues and is reflected in the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652B.
16. See id. illus. 1, 7 (discussing potential cases against media defendants).
1998]
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to protect media intrusions that serve a significant public interest. By
identifying the factors relevant to whether newsgathering has crossed
the line into invasion of privacy, the newsgatherer's privilege would
provide a nuanced approach to the problem of simultaneously
accommodating privacy and the right to gather news. Moreover, the
privilege would give the media guidance in avoiding tort liability that
is sorely lacking in current tort law. Perhaps the greatest virtue of the
newsgatherer's privilege is that it would work within the framework of
traditional tort doctrine to curb intrusive newsgathering. Unlike
constitutional solutions, the newsgatherer's privilege would therefore
strike the requisite balance between flexibility and predictability in
solving the complex problem of intrusive newsgathering.'7
HI. INTRusIvE NEWSGAT-ERING ON THE RISE
Prying, spying, and lying by the media are not new techniques."
Undercover reporting, in particular, is part and parcel of the noble
tradition of investigative journalism. 9 Nellie Bly, who wrote for
Joseph Pulitzer's New York World in the 1880s and 1890s, gained
17. Many of the articles that deal with newsgathering torts are concerned primarily
with the threat tort liability poses to the media, and these articles therefore tend to advocate
constitutional "solutions" to the problem. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a
Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment Protection for
Newsgathering, 58 Otno ST. L.J. 1135, 1139 (1997); Paul A. LeBel, The Constitutional
Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection from Tort Liability for
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. L.J. 1145, 1147 (1996) [hereinafter
LeBel, Getting the News]. In this Article, I argue that tort law is better suited to give due
weight to both privacy and newsgathering interests and that tort law can balance these
interests without violating the First Amendment. In doing so, I attempt to respond to those
who see little role for privacy in an open society.
18. In their seminal article creating and defining a tort right to privacy, Warren and
Brandeis expressed concern that the press was "overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 196. They also
were alarmed by the proliferation of "mechanical devices" that posed a threat to privacy. See
id. at 195. Professor David Leebron suggests that "surreptitious photography and the
unauthorized use of photographs seem to have been matters of widespread concern" at the
time Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article. David W. Leebron, The Right to
Privacy s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law, 41 CASE W, RES. L. REv. 769, 774
(1991); see also James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR. L.
REv. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 875, 889
(1979) (noting contemporaneous criticisms of the press).
19. As one commentator has noted, "[b]y definition, investigative journalism must
involve the invasion of privacy since its aim is to disclose what would otherwise be
concealed." Denis McQuail, The Mass Media and Privacy, in PrvAcY 177, 180 (John B.
Young ed., 1978). One journalism textbook describes investigative reporting as follows:
"Any good reporting is investigative reporting. But the term has come to mean reporting in
depth to reveal public or private behavior that otherwise might go unseen-usually criminal
or antisocial behavior, but not always." MITCHELL V. CHARNLEY & BLAIR CHARNLEY,
REPORTING 337 (4th ed. 1979).
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notoriety as one of the earliest reporters to go undercover to gather
news."0 By pretending to be insane, Bly obtained access to the
women's asylum at Blackwell's Island, and her subsequent expos6 of
the "human rat trap" she found there was a sensation, prompting
public debate and reform.2
Upton Sinclair's The Jungle is another early example of a story
obtained by surreptitious means. Although Sinclair originally got a
job in the meat-packing industry to uncover unfair labor conditions
and to expose "the inhumanity of capitalism,"'22 it was Sinclair's
horrific descriptions of the unsanitary food handling practices of the
industry that led to federal regulation.23 Both Sinclair and Bly used
false identities to give readers a view from the inside, and this
technique gave their stories the impact necessary to galvanize public
opinion for change.
Even in Bly's day reporters adopted false identities for less than
noble ends. Although Bly went undercover to expose the horrors of
insane asylums and prisons, she also went undercover to expose the
horrors of life as a chorus girl-most notably, the indignity of being
issued ill-fitting tights and ballet slippers.24
Today, intrusive newsgathering threatens privacy more ominously
than ever before. Media intrusions are on the rise, and new
technologies make them more invasive than ever before. Moreover,
most commentators agree that the increase in media intrusions is the
result of increasing competition for ratings and profits rather than an
increasing desire to serve the public interest."
20. See BROOKE KROEGER, NELLIE BLY: DAREDEVIL, REPORTER, FEMINIST at xiii
(1994); AUrUMN STEPHEN, WILD WOMEN 190 (1992).
21. See STEPHEN, supra note 20, at 190-91.
22. JON A. YODER, UPTON SINCLAIR 39 (1975). Sinclair wrote: "I wished to frighten
the country by a picture of what its industrial masters were doing to their victims; entirely by
chance I had stumbled on another discovery-what they were doing to the meat-supply of
the civilized world. In other words, I aimed at the public's heart, and by accident I hit it in
the stomach." Id. at 40 (quoting Upton Sinclair, COSMOPOLrrAN MAo., Oct. 1906).
23. See YODER, supra note 22, at 40-41, 43-44; James R. Barrett, Introduction to
UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE at xii (1988) (1906) (noting that the passage of the Pure Food
and Drug Act was a result of the publication of The Jungle).
24. See STEPHEN, supra note 20, at 190-91.
25. See JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 161 (3d ed. 1997); James
Boylan, Punishing the Press: The Public Passes Some Tough Judgments on Libel, Fairness,
and "Fraud", 35 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 24; David A. Logan,
Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IowA L.
REv. 161, 162 (1998) [hereinafter Logan, Masked Media] (linking undercover newsgathering
to ratings and profits); Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REv. 989, 1009-17 (1995).
Note the irony that although more information is available today than ever from public
records and other information sources, the use of intrusive newsgathering techniques
19981
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The increasingly competitive nature of the media marketplace
directly contributes to the rise of intrusive newsgathering" 6 Television
news magazine shows, such as Prime lime Live, 20/20, and Inside
Edition, have proliferated in the wake of the highly successful 60
Minutes. These shows have learned that prying, spying, and lying are
highly profitable,27 and their success in attracting audiences with
dramatic exposes has helped set the standard for print journalists as
well. As the number of competitors increases, the media must use
ever more aggressive newsgathering methods to compete for audience
share. Ambush interviews provide little additional content to a story,
but they provide footage that makes the subject look as if she has
something to hide.28 Hidden cameras may be excellent tools for
uncovering serious abuses, but the media also use them to make the
audience feel privy to catching a subject in the act, whether she has
committed a major crime or minor peccadillo.
The point, of course, is to provide audiences with "infotainment."
Having conditioned the audience to expect exciting exposes, the media
must now deliver news and information packaged as entertainment, or
as a more cynical observer might describe it, they must deliver
entertainment that pretends to be news.29 It is therefore no accident
that the media's use of undercover investigations peaks during ratings
sweeps week, for undercover investigations deliver larger audiences
and, with them, larger profits.3°
continues to rise. This is because intrusive newsgathering methods help deliver information
in a more dramatic and hence more marketable way.
26. See C. THoMAs DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERiNG AND THE LAW 593 (1997)
(noting that the availability of miniature cameras and the powerful images they produce have
arguably increased media's incentives to use intrusive newsgathering techniques); see also
Clark, supra note 3 (quoting former NBC News President Reuven Frank: "Nothing matters
anymore, except .the competition for audience .... Everybody in the spectrum is fighting
everybody else for audience, so you're getting a mushing up of standards. Standards are fine,
if they don't lose audience-that's become the marching slogan.").
27. The programs are also inexpensive to produce relative to programs that require
talented writers, dire&ors, and actors to acquire ratings points.
28. See Kevin F. O'Neil, Note, The Ambush Interview: A False Light Invasion of
Privacy?, 34 CASE W. Rns. L. REv. 72, 77-81 (1983) (explaining that ambush interviews
make even innocent subjects look guilty because subjects tend to respond angrily and
evasively to suddenly being confronted with reporters' accusations).
29. See Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1993, at 19 (quoting Dan Rather as
saying, "It's the ratings, stupid .... They've got us putting more fuzz and wuzz on the air...
so as to compete not with other news programs but with entertainment programs .. ").
30. See John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The
Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication of fil-Gotten Information, 4
WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 1111, 1118 (1996) (explaining that "competitive pressures among
the media have created a frenzy... to catch a sensational story" by using new technologies).
180 [Vol. 73:173
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The competitive nature of the media marketplace is insidious
because it puts those media organizations attempting to exercise
restraint at a competitive disadvantage, rendering their efforts at
restraint meaningless. For example, following Princess Diana's death,
a CBS executive was demoted (or at least deprived of responsibility
for hard news coverage) because he did not immediately break into
regular programming to report the news of her demise.31 Similarly,
Newsweek's initial restraint in the Lewinsky scandal had little effect.
Although Newsweek had early access to tapes of the conversations
between Linda Tripp and Monica Lewinsky, its editors decided to hold
the story until they could provide additional verification, because once
the story ran, a private person would be thrust into the blinding glare
of the public spotlight." Within hours of Newsweek's decision not to
run the story, the information appeared on the Internet, courtesy of the
Drudge Report, a source of instant, largely unedited, and occasionally
accurate scandal-mongering.33 These incidents demonstrate that press
restraint and concern for individual privacy receive few rewards in the
so-called marketplace of ideas.
A second factor at work in the rise of intrusive newsgathering is
the widespread availability of ingenious surveillance technologies.
Tiny cameras slightly larger than a lipstick case can be worn inside a
jacket or a baseball cap,34 and miniature recorders can be concealed in
a pocket, ready to transmit the words of the target to millions of
listeners." A reporter need not even be physically present to
31. See Bill Carter, A Month Later the Fallout Hits, N.Y TuEs, Oct. 8, 1997, at E8
(reporting that CBS shifted the job responsibilities of Lane Venardos, who was in charge of
hard news coverage for CBS, to special events coverage after Diana's death and stating that
staff members believed Venardos was "the fall guy" for CBS's failure to "initiate continuing
live coverage of the automobile crash that killed Diana until more than an hour after she
died").
32. See Mark Jurkowitz, The Drudge Reports Scandalous Scoop, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 15, 1998, at El (reporting that after the Drudge Report ran a story on the Lewinsky
matter, Newsweek released its story on its America Online site, revealing that Newsweek
knew of allegations of a sexual relationship between Clinton and Lewinsky for almost a
year).
33. Roger Bull, Online and Loving It, FLA. TIMEs UNION, Feb. 27, 1998, at Dl
(reporting that Drudge, whose website (www.drudgereport.com) gets more than one million
visitors per month, "often breaks news before anyone else gets it, in part because he doesn't
always check his facts as well as more reputable media types"); see also Jurkowitz, supra
note 32, at El (noting that Drudge concedes that he does not always get his facts straight).
34. See McClurg, supra note 25, at 1018 (describing a variety of surveillance devices
that threaten privacy). Such cameras were used in a number of cases. See, e.g., Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 927 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Kersis v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Media L. Rptr. 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
35. See Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 816 (M.D.N.C.
1995).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 181 1998-1999
TULANE LA WREVIEW [Vol. 73:173
eavesdrop on a subject's conversation: the "shotgun mike" can pick
up sounds as far as sixty yards away.36 Even worse, new surveillance
technologies exist that have the potential to destroy what little privacy
citizens have left.
37
It is little surprise then that a growing consensus insists that
something be done about intrusive newsgathering. A 1996 poll by the
Center for Media and Public Affairs indicated that eighty percent of
respondents thought the media invaded individual privacy, and fifty-
two percent thought the media abused their First Amendment
freedoms.38 More recent polls show that the public is even more
concerned about media invasions of privacy than about political bias
in the media, and eighty percent of those polled agreed that the media
"often invade[s] people's privacy."'39
Yet the public's concern about media invasions of privacy is
sparked more by current events than by close analysis of the law's
failures in this area.4" The media's rush to judgment of Richard Jewell,
the security guard whose name was leaked as a suspect in the Atlanta
Olympic bombing, galvanized public opinion against the media.41
More pointedly, the media's incessant hounding of Princess Diana,
36. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1424 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (involving
the use of "shotgun mikes").
37. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J. L. &
TECH. 383, 386 (1997).
38. See Sharkey, supra note 10, at 20; see also John Hughes, Solving the Media's
Credibility Problem, CHRSTIAN Sci. MoNiTOR, Apr. 16, 1997, at 19 (reporting that in a
WSJ/NBC poll, only 21% of respondents believed the media were "very" or "mostly" honest,
and that in a Gallup poll, only 29% of respondents had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of
confidence in the press).
39. TED J. SMITH II & S. ROBERT LICHTYER, WHAT THE PEOPLE WANT FROM THE
PRESS 167 (1997) (discussing poll results).
40. See Howard Kurtz, Public to Press: Just Play Fair; They're Peeved by
Intrusiveness and Deception. But Are New Laws the Answer?, WASH. POST., Sept. 15, 1997,
at B4 (listing a number of events that sparked public concern, such as the lying and hidden
cameras in ABC's story on Food Lion and Connie Chung's assurances to Newt Gingrich's
mother that her negative remarks about Hillary Clinton would be "just between you and me,"
even though these remarks were later aired).
41. Jewell was the security guard who found the bomb during the 1996 Summer
Olympic Games in Atlanta. See Bill Rankin, An Emotional Jewell Recalls 88-day Ordeal,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 29, 1996, at Al. Jewell was originally hailed as a hero but was
then identified as a suspect in the case. See id. After an "88-day nightmare" of almost
constant media surveillance and hounding, Jewell was cleared of suspicion by a letter from
the United States Attomey. See id. Jewell sued several of the media organizations that had
reported he was a suspect in the bombing, and he ultimately settled cases against CNN and
NBC News. See Jay Croft & Bill Rankin, Jewell Files Suit Against Newspaper, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Jan. 28, 1997, at C2. He also sued the owner of the Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, seven reporters for the paper, and its managing editor. See id. The Atlanta
Journal and Constitution was the first newspaper to report Jewell was a suspect See id.
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culminating in her death while being chased by paparazzi, prompted
an unprecedented level of soul-searching by both the media and the
public. Even while the media debated whether or not coverage of
Princess Diana went too far, broadcasters were showing funeral
preparations and "Diana retrospectives" around the clock.42 In fact,
Diana's death received more coverage than any other single news
event since the 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev.43 Of
course, the ultimate irony is that these cases generated public outrage
by the very same public that apparently had a ravenous appetite for the
information in the first place."
At the same time the public has been clamoring for more privacy
protection, the media and its lawyers complain that current law fails to
adequately protect their newsgathering activities.4" If intrusive
newsgathering techniques are becoming more common, so too are
lawsuits based on the methods reporters use to gather the news.46
Clever plaintiffs' lawyers are starting to deploy novel theories and to
exploit existing tort doctrines in order to sidestep the First Amendment
and win victories against the media, although (the brouhaha over the
recent Food Lion case47 notwithstanding) such victories are still
relatively rare.4"
New legislation is likely to be forthcoming. In the wake of
Princess Diana's death, Representative Sonny Bono, a Republican
from California, introduced a bill aimed at paparazzi that would
impose criminal fines on journalists who "persistently" follow or chase
a person who has a "reasonable expectation of privacy.' 4  California
State Senator Tom Hayden proposed a "Paparazzi Harassment Act"
42. Ironically or not, the saturation coverage of Princess Diana's death garnered
fantastic ratings.
43. See Sharkey, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that Diana's death received more
coverage than the landing of U.S. troops in Somalia).
44. This seems to be a case of what I call the "stop me before I kill again" syndrome.
Although the public ostensibly is upset by the media's unrelenting hounding of celebrities,
the fact remains that the media would not engage in such behavior if there were not a market
for the privacy-invading information they provide. See infra notes 229-237 and
accompanying text.
45. See Logan, Masked Media, supra note 25, at 161 n.12 (citing sources).
46. See Gail D. Cox, Privacy's Frontiers at Issue: Unwilling Subjects of Tabloid TV
Are Suing, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1.
47. See BLACK Er AL., supra note 25, at 164 ("[N]o 'Prime Time Live' story has
generated as much public attention and journalistic soul-searching as the reporting on the
Food Lion supermarket chain."); see infra Part IV's discussion of the Food Lion case.
48. See itfra Part IV.
49. Protection From Personal Intrusion Act, H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997); see also
Jenifer Joyce, Lost Photo Opportunities: First Amendment Experts Question
Constitutionality of Proposals to Prevent Harassment by Paparazzi, ABA J., Nov. 1997, at
3 6-37; Sharkey, supra note 10, at 22.
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that would impose fines on journalists "threatening, intimidating,
harassing, or caus[ing] alarm, harm or the potential of harm to any
person who is the subject of media interest."0 Similarly, California
Senate Majority Leader Charles Calderon has drafted a "Personal
Privacy Act" that broadly defines intrusions on privacy and alters the
law to protect victims of defamation."
Even though these proposals are fraught with constitutional
difficulties and therefore stand very little chance of adoption and
enforcement,"2 the impetus behind them is likely to generate more
refined proposals. Certainly the current state of the law merits reform.
Before proposing reforms, however, it is important to understand
where the existing law has gone wrong in trying to strike the delicate
balance between privacy and First Amendment values.
III. PRIVACY VS. THE MEDIA: WHY THE LAW FAVORS THE LATTER
Any law designed to protect privacy must strike a delicate
balance to accommodate both First Amendment values and the
realities of life in an open society. Neither constitutional law nor tort
law, however, has developed nuanced approaches to the problem of
deciding when intrusive newsgathering techniques are justified.
A, Prying, Spying, Lying, and the First Amendment
At the constitutional level, the scope of First Amendment
protection for newsgathering remains a contested issue. 3 Despite the
unassailable logic of the proposition that gathering news is an essential
precursor to publishing it,54 the media receive far less First
50. Sharkey, supra note 10, at 22.
51. Seeid. at 18,22.
52. See Joyce, supra note 49, at 36-37.
53. See DmNs ET AL., supra note 26, at 14 ("The freedom of the press to gather the
news, free of excessive governmental interference ... [is], however, less certain [than the
freedom to publish].").
54. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (plurality opinion)
("[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."); id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[W]ithout freedom to acquire information
the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised."); In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 689
(Pa. 1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (asserting that absent a right to gather news, "freedom
of the press becomes a river without water"); LeBel, Getting the News, supra note 17, at 1154
("News acquisition is a matter of constitutional significance because it is a logically and
pragmatically necessary component of the publication of news that serves a vital
constitutional function."). James Madison also viewed the right to acquire information as
central to the process of democratic deliberation. See Letter from J. Madison to W.T. Barry
(Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRriINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (S. Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.').
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Amendment protection in gathering news than they do in publishing
it.5 The Supreme Court has grudgingly conceded that "newsgathering
is not without its First Amendment protections,"5 6  but has
simultaneously denied the media First Amendment protection from
generally applicable laws that affect the newsgathering process. 7
Lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's conflicting
pronouncements on newsgathering as authority to do as they wish."8
Some have cited the Court's decisions as authority for extending First
Amendment protection to newsgathering 9 Others have cited the
same decisions as authority for denying it.60
1. The Supreme Court's Conflicting Views on Newsgathering
The confusion in the lower courts originates with the Supreme
Court's grudging and equivocal pronouncements on newsgathering in
55. Strong First Amendment privileges insulate the media from tort liability based on
the publication of private or defamatory information. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that "where a newspaper publishes truthful information which
it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly
tailored to a state interest of the highest order"); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
495 (1975) (holding that "the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful
information contained in official court records open to public inspection'); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (holding that in actions for defamation brought by
private figures involved in matters of public concern, plaintiffs may not recover punitive or
presumed damages absent a showing of actual malice); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (holding that public officials may not recover for libel unless they
show that the defendant made defamatory statements with actual malice). For extended
discussion of these developments and how they affect newsgathering, see Logan, Masked
Media, supra note 25, passim. See also Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication
Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 35-49 (1982) (criticizing the
lesser protection given to newsgathering).
56. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 (holding that the First Amendment does not give
reporters a privilege to ignore grand jury subpoenas).
57. See id. at 682-83; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991)
(stating that "enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter
scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations").
Cohen applied the law of promissory estoppel to the press. See id. at 665.
58. Academic commentators tend to oversimplify the Supreme Court's decisions as
standing for the proposition that "generally applicable laws limiting newsgathering do not
offend the First Amendment." Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669; see also Timothy B. Dyk,
Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 927, 928 (1992)
("[T]he [Supreme] Court has yet to explicitly afford special protections to the newsgathering
process.'); Walsh et al., supra note 30, at 1118.
59. See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995);
Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1416-17 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (framing the issue in an
intrusion case as whether the First Amendment protects the use of modem technologies in
newsgathering).
60. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Branzburg
as authority that "[c]rimes and torts committed in newsgathering are not protected");
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971).
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the leading case of Branzburg v. Hayes.61 Branzburg is sometimes
cited for the proposition that the First Amendment provides no
immunity to reporters for torts or crimes committed while gathering
the news.62 The specific issue in Branzburg, however, was whether
reporters must respond to state or federal grand jury subpoenas about
information obtained from confidential news sources.63  I other
words, Branzburg was a "reporter's privilege" case. The case was not
really about what newsgathering methods are constitutionally
protected or even permissible; rather, it was about the obligations of
journalists who possess information sought by a grand jury. Moreover,
Branzburg's holding was quite narrow. By a margin of one vote,' a the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
subpoenaed reporters from testifying before a criminal grand jury
about information obtained from confidential sources.65
Branzburg is nonetheless a pivotal case defining what types of
newsgathering are protected by the First Amendment due to the
breadth of its pronouncements about newsgathering. Branzburg sets
forth two potentially conflicting principles that subsequent cases have
never adequately reconciled. The first principle is that "newsgathering
is not without its First Amendment protections."'66 If one ignores the
curious phrasing, this statement represents an affirmative
acknowledgment of a constitutional right to gather news; this right, in
61. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
62. See, e.g., Galella, 487 F.2d at 995; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 (stating
that reporters may not steal documents or use wiretaps to obtain information in violation of
"valid criminal laws").
63. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668. Branzburg was a consolidation of four different
cases. In two of the cases, Branzburg, a reporter for the Courier-Journal in Louisville,
Kentucky, was subpoenaed to testify before grand juries but refused to reveal the identity of
individuals he observed making hashish and using illegal drugs. See id. at 668-69. In the
third case, a subpoena was issued to obtain information from a television reporter about
events and individuals he observed while inside the headquarters of the Black Panthers. See
id. at 672-73. In the fourth case, a reporter for the New York imes refused to respond to a
subpoena requiring him "to testify and to bring with him notes and tape recordings of
interviews" with officials of the Black Panther Party. Id. at 675. In the plurality opinion,
Justice White framed the issue in the case as follows: 'The sole issue before us is the
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer
questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime." Id. at 682.
64. Justice Potter Stewart later suggested that given "Mr. Justice Powell's concurring
opinion," the Court rejected the reporters' claims of privilege by a vote of "four and a half to
four and a half." Potter Stewart, Or Of the Press, 26 HAST. L.J. 631,635 (1975).
65. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. The Court declined to "interpret[] the First
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy." Id.
Although Justice Powell joined in the majority opinion, his subsequent concurrence
suggested that he would have extended reporters a testimonial privilege in certain limited
circumstances. For a discussion of this strange result, see infra note 71.
66. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
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turn, presumably might limit a state's authority to impose sanctions on
intrusive newsgathering.67 But the curious phrasing is no accident, for
the remainder of the opinion indicates that while a constitutional right
may exist, it is quite limited in scope.68
This first principle, that newsgathering merits some constitutional
protection, is ultimately subordinated to a second, more fundamental
principle: The press is subject to the same laws that apply to all
citizens, regardless of whether or not such laws place an incidental
burden on newsgathering.69 Or as the Court stated, the press receives
"no special immunity from the application of general laws" and "no
special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."'7 If the
general public has a right to use particular methods to gather news, so
does the press; if the public does not, then neither does the press.7
67. Of course, the Supreme Court could assert that the First Amendment protects
only nonintrusive newsgathering.
68. Even Justice Stewart's dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, concluded only that "a right to gather news, of some dimension, must exist."
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Subsequent decisions
do suggest that, at a minimum, the First Amendment protects routine newsgathering
techniques. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Nicholson v. McClatchy
Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The court in Nicholson stated:
"[t]he news gathering component of the freedom of the press-the right to seek out
information-is privileged at least to the extent it involves 'routine ... reporting
techniques."' Nicholson, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
69. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. This principle was first recognized in
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937), which held that the Associated Press
was not exempt from complying with the National Labor Relations Act, and was further
extended in Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). See discussion supra notes
57-58 and accompanying text.
70. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683 (quoting Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33).
71. See id. at 684 ("[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a
constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.").
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not deny the close relationship between
newsgathering and news dissemination. However, the Court's acknowledgment of the link
between newsgathering and news dissemination is couched in rather limited terms. The
opinion states that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated," but the remainder of the opinion suggests that such protection would
only apply to serious infringements on the right to gather news. Id. at 681.
Implicit in the Court's decision, however, is the notion that forcing the press to comply
with generally applicable laws would have relatively little effect on the newsgathering
process. The press, after all, has independent incentives to gather news. The relatively minor
hindrance to newsgathering posed by being forced occasionally to respond to a grand jury
subpoena is more than outweighed by society's interests in law enforcement. Moreover, the
press has at its disposal self-help remedies to prevent "harassment or substantial harm." See
id. at 706. Given this "pragmatic view" of the press, the Court found it unnecessary to work
out the exact scope of those protections. See id. at 706-08.
The Court did, however, recognize that an exception might be necessary when law
enforcement officials use subpoenas for the purpose of harassing the press. Moreover, laws
that "single out" or discriminate against the press must meet the highest level of
1998]
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The logic of the decision therefore contains an internal
contradiction.72 If newsgathering receives some degree of First
Amendment protection, as presumably it must due to its integral
connection to news dissemination, the press should likewise receive
some degree of special immunity from the application of general laws,
just as it receives some immunity when publishing the news. Further,
presumably even a general law that incidentally barred traditional
reporting practices, such as interviewing witnesses to an accident,
would violate the First Amendment. Nonetheless, neither in
constitutional scrutiny. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'n of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
72. The real confusion about the extent of the right to gather news stems from what
the dissent generously described as an "enigmatic" concurrence by Justice Powell. See
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell joined in the majority
opinion, making him the crucial fifth vote, but he also wrote a separate concurrence to
emphasize how "limited" the majority's opinion was. See id. at 709-10 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Powell's concurrence seriously undermines the logic of the majority opinion.
Whereas the majority emphasized that the press has no special immunity from generally
applicable laws, Powell emphasized that reporters do have constitutional rights. He therefore
read the majority opinion as allowing for a balancing of these rights against the government's
interest in law enforcement on a case by case basis. See id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
Powell reasoned that "[any] asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell seemed to assume that First Amendment interests would only be threatened in
rare cases and that his balancing procedure would be unnecessary in the run of the mill cases.
This assumption has been belied by the tendency of the press to treat every subpoena case as
a serious threat to First Amendment freedoms.
Justice Powell's reading of the majority opinion is misguided. From the majority's
perspective, the balance was already tipped because the press must comply with generally
applicable laws. Generally applicable laws that merely impose an incidental burden upon the
press are not subject to balancing, or indeed to any form of heightened constitutional scrutiny.
Even if balancing were appropriate, the majority opinion overwhelmingly favors law
enforcement interests over First Amendment interests when reporters are subpoenaed to
testify before grand juries.
A further irony of Branzburg is that Justice Powell's concurrence ultimately lent weight
to the approach of the dissenters, who developed a detailed balancing analysis to deal with
"reporter's privilege" cases. See id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's dissent
explicitly advocated a qualified privilege for reporters who were subpoenaed by grand juries.
See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Although the balancing advocated by Justice Stewart is
much more protective than that advocated by Justice Powell, together their opinions represent
four votes for a balancing approach. Justice Douglas cast the fifth vote in favor of extending
First Amendment protection. In his dissent, Douglas adopted the most protective position of
all: absolute immunity from grand jury subpoenas for reporters. See id. at 712 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Branzburg therefore represents five votes favoring an extraordinarily
circumscribed right to gather news (when one considers that Justice Powell joined the
majority), and five votes for a more expansive constitutional right (when one adds Justice
Powell's concurrence to the dissenting opinions). Justice Powell's concurrence has made
Justice Stewart's approach as influential as the majority, leading many lower courts to
interpret the case "as creating a federal constitutional privilege." MARc A. FrA.NKUN &
DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 499 (5th ed. 1995).
188
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Branzburg nor its subsequent decisions did the Supreme Court clarify
exactly what a constitutional right to gather news might cover.73
The Supreme Court's most recent newsgathering case, Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., initially appears to resolve the uncertainty in
Branzburg by denying that there is any constitutional right to gather
news.74 Cohen did not deal with intrusive newsgathering." The issue
in Cohen was whether the First Amendment permits a plaintiff to
recover damages under a state's promissory estoppel law for a
reporter's breach of a promise of confidentiality.76 The Court found
the case to be controlled by the second principle of Branzburg, namely
"that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news."'77
Even if promissory estoppel posed an obstacle to the reporter's
ability to gather news, it was at most an "incidental, and
constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a
73. The two basic principles underlying Branzburg have been at issue in at least two
separate lines of cases. In cases addressing whether or not the press has a constitutional right
of access to prisons or to interview prisoners, the Supreme Court has held that no balancing
of First Amendment interests is necessary where state and federal restrictions on access apply
equally to the press and to the general public. See, e.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16; Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35
(1974).
On the other hand, in cases dealing with access to courtrooms, the Court has recognized
that both the press and the public have a constitutional right of access to attend criminal trials.
See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) ("[T]he State's
justification in denying access [to criminal trials] must be a weighty one."); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that the right to attend
criminal trials is "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.").
In these cases, the Court has been careful to say that the press has no greater rights than
the general public, even though this statement cannot be literally true. See, e.g., Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (Stewart J., concurring). "[erms of access that are reasonably
imposed on individual members of the public, may, if they impede effective reporting
without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to
convey to the general public what the visitors see." Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Otherwise,
there would be no reason to prefer reporters over ordinary citizens in allocating seating at
highly publicized trials. In these situations, the Court recognizes that although both press and
public are equal, the press is more equal when it comes to trial access. Thus, it seems as if
the only time the Court will extend the press' newsgathering rights over and above the rights
of the general public is when the press must act as a surrogate for the public due to the
necessity of allocating limited resources.
74. 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 665.
77. Id. at 669. The newspapers attempted to invoke a line of cases that the state may
not restrict the publication of truthful information lawfully obtained absent a state interest of
the highest order, but the Court quickly recast it as a case about newsgathering rather than
publication. See id. at 668-69. The Court seemed to view the press as seeking special
treatment to which it was not entitled.
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generally applicable law that requires those who make certain kinds of
promises to keep them."'78 The majority largely ignored the first
principle of Branzburg,79 and never elaborated on whether the First
Amendment places any meaningful limits on a state's ability to restrict
newsgathering that invades the rights of its citizens. Thus, even after
Cohen, the only thing that is clear about newsgathering and the First
Amendment is that if the First Amendment protects newsgathering,
the scope of its protection is quite limited.
2. Confusion in the Lower Courts
Lower courts have diverged as to how much constitutional
protection they accord the media from liability for newsgathering
behavior that violates state tort law. Most lower courts addressing
such claims refuse to weigh any First Amendment interest in the
balance when determining whether intrusive newsgathering behavior
is tortious8s Dietemann v. Time, Inc. is a classic illustration of this
approach.8' In Dietemann, the seminal surreptitious surveillance case,
two reporters adopted false identities to gain access to the home of a
quack doctor. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit saw no
reason why the First Amendment should shield the reporters from the
reach of state tort law.82 In language that has been widely cited and
followed,83 the court emphasized that "[t]he First Amendment has
78. Id. at 672.
79. The debate between the majority and the dissenters in Cohen was not a debate
about whether the enforcement of promissory estoppel law invaded a constitutional right to
gather news. The dissenters viewed Cohen as infringing on the right to publish the news.
See id. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Blackmun (with whom Justices
Marshall and Souter joined) viewed Cohen as governed by the principles of Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), and Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674 (Blackmun J., dissenting). The dissent would have held that
applying the state's promissory estoppel law violated the First Amendment's prohibition
against punishment of truthful information or opinion. See id. at 675-76 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor) viewed
the case as controlled by the Court's decisions requiring a balancing of the competing
interests involved, and ultimately concluded that "the State's interest in enforcing a
newspaper's promise of confidentiality [is] insufficient to outweigh the interest in unfettered
publication of the information revealed... " Id. at 679.
80. I discussed this trend in a slightly different and less developed form in 1992. See
Lyrissa C. Barnett, Note, Intrusion and the Investigative Reporter, 71 TEx. L. REv. 433, 438-
41(1992).
81. 449 F2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1971).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Belluomo v. KAKE T.V. & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 841-42 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1979); Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y App. Div. 1978)
(concerning surreptitious surveillance); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.YS.2d 220, 226
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding no constitutional privilege protecting against liability for torts
[Vol. 73:173
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never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or
crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The First
Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by
electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office."84
Applying this logic, the Dietemann court found no need to weigh
any First Amendment interest in the balance: reporters are subject to
tort law to the same extent as other citizens. This logic has influenced
many courts, leading them to conclude that there is no need to extend
First Amendment protection to immunize newsgathering from the
reach of state tort law.8" Indeed, one court has noted the "apparent
hopelessness" of the argument that the First Amendment shields the
press from liability for trespass.8 6
In contrast, some courts have read the Supreme Court's decisions
as precedent for the opposite proposition-that the First Amendment
circumscribes the ability of state tort law to sanction intrusive
newsgathering behavior; however, even these courts suggest that the
scope of First Amendment protection for newsgathering is limited. 7
committed prior to publication); Prahl v. Brosalme, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980) (finding no constitutional right to trespass).
84. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249; see also Thomas Emerson, The Right of Privacy and
Freedom of the Press, 14 HARv. C.Rt-C.L. L. REV. 329, 332 (1979). But see Floyd Abrams,
The Press, Privacy, and the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1977 (Magazine), at 67
(arguing that the press should not be liable when otherwise tortious conduct benefits the
public).
85. See cases cited supra note 83. It is worth noting that the cases at least imply that
routine reporting techniques are constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979); Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr.
58, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he news gathering component of the freedom of the press-
the right to seek out information-is privileged at least to the extent it involves 'routine...
reporting techniques."). Presumably many courts would not consider many of the
techniques I discuss in this article, including surreptitious surveillance and hounding,
"routine," even though, as discussed in Part II, they are becoming increasingly common.
86. See Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media L. Reptr. 2417, 2418 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. 1981). One should not generalize too much from this statement. As Part III
suggests, courts tend to view trespass as protecting a more absolute right than other torts
protect.
87. See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995); Galella
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (although citing Branzburg for the proposition
that "[c]rimes and torts committed in newsgathering are not protected," the court found that
First Amendment interests should be balanced against plaintiff's rights where there is an
"overriding public interest" in the information sought); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413
(E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1526-27 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in part after balancing the media's
right to gather news against the plaintiff's right of privacy); New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ'g, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("gathering information for
dissemination to the public" is protected by the First Amendment), aff'd, 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 808 (N.M. Ct. App.
1975) (noting that even if plaintiffs suffered "intrusion upon seclusion," the First Amendment
bars tort liability where the information published is newsworthy).
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The most notable example is Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos.88
In Desnick's suit based on ABC's newsgathering methods-including
surreptitious surveillance and an "ambush interview" 89-- Judge Posner
paid homage to the principles of Cohen, stating that "the media have
no general immunity from tort or contract liability."90  Yet Judge
Posner simultaneously cited Hustler Magazine v. Falwelf' for the
proposition that newsgathering merits the same type of First
Amendment protection as publication:
Today's "tabloid" style investigative television reportage [is] conducted
by networks desperate for viewers in an increasingly competitive
television market .... [A]lthough it is often shrill, one-sided, and
offensive, and sometimes defamatory, ... [i]t is entitled to all the
safeguards with which the-Supreme Court has surrounded liability for
defamation. And it is entitled to them regardless of the name of the
tort, ... and ... regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed at the
content of the broadcast or the production of the broadcast.92
Judge Posner's statements represent the same tension seen in the
Supreme Court's newsgathering jurisprudence. On one hand, he
asserts that reporters are subject to tort liability for intrusive
newsgathering. On the other, he asserts that reporters are entitled to
constitutional protection to some as yet unspecified extent. But if
newsgathering receives the same First Amendment protection as
publication, then it does qualify for some degree of immunity from tort
liability. Although Judge Posner seems to lean toward providing more
First Amendment protection for newsgathering than the Branzburg
court did, his opinion ultimately gives no more guidance about what a
constitutional right to gather news would look like.93
88. 44 F.3d 1345; see also Wolfson, 924 F Supp. at 1413. In Wolfson, Inside Edition
reporters engaged in sustained, harassing surveillance of the plaintiffs in order to obtain
information for a story on the high salaries of U.S. Health Care executives. See Wolfson, 924
F Supp. at 1417. The plaintiffs brought a variety of tort actions based on the reporters'
intrusive behavior and also requested injunctive relief. See id. In granting plaintiffs an
injunction, the district judge explicitly framed the issue as representing "the extent to which
the First Amendment protects newsgathering by T. journalists using modem technologies."
Id. Although the opinion concedes that newsgathering is constitutionally protected, it
nonetheless views this protection as quite limited and finds that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the reporters' "hounding, harassing and ambushing" of the plaintiffs did not
"advance the fundamental policies underlying the First Amendment." Id. at 1433.
89. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1348.
90. Id. at 1355.
91. 485 U.S. 46(1988).
92. Desnick, 44 U.S. at 1355 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Note, however,
that because Judge Posner had already dismissed plaintiffs' newsgathering claims on
nonconstitutional grounds, this statement is dicta.
93. For discussion of whether or not the creation of a broader constitutional right to
gather news is warranted, see infra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
192 [Vol. 73:173
HeinOnline  -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 192 1998-1999
PRYING, SPYING, AND LYING
Unresolved tensions in the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence are played out in lower courts, which must strike a
balance between newsgathering and privacy interests. States,
therefore, remain relatively free to define the legal consequences of
intrusive newsgathering in ways that do not give short shrift to privacy
interests. As the next section demonstrates, the Supreme Court created
an opportunity for tort law to put more restraints on intrusive
newsgathering behaviors. Unfortunately, tort law never really seized
that opportunity.
B. Tort Law' Flaws
It is clear that the media receive less First Amendment protection
in gathering the news than in publishing it. Therefore, tort law is a
potentially effective weapon to protect privacy against intrusive
newsgathering techniques. Indeed, tort law does a relatively good job
of curbing the most serious newsgathering abuses. Rarely does one
hear of a journalist engaging in burglary, theft, or even simple trespass
in order to get information for a story.94 Yet tort law promises far
more; it promises remedies for a broad range of newsgathering
behaviors that invade both property and dignitary interests. Tort law
subjects prying journalists to liability (at least in theory) for a variety
of torts, including trespass, intrusion, fraud and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and, if recent cases are any indication, the list of
available tort theories may be growing." Nonetheless, these torts
largely fail to make the fine distinctions necessary to accommodate
both individual privacy and the right to gather news, and, inevitably, it
is privacy that suffers.96
94. These newsgathering behaviors are both criminal and tortious. Obviously tort
law is more effective when it is also backed by a criminal sanction. Even in trespass cases,
however, hard issues arise when the owner consents to the entry of a reporter who has
adopted a false identity or who has failed to state his or her true purpose for entering the
property. See, e.g., Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351-53 (recognizing that the Desnick Eye Center
would not have consented to the entry of patients if it had been aware that the defendants
were attempting to gather news for a television expose, but concluding that the consent
obtained by fraud in this case was valid because there was no invasion of any of the interests
that the law of trespass protects); Food Lion Inc., v. Capitol Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp.
1217, 1221-24 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying summary judgment because a reasonable jury
could find that the defendants were not actually Food Lion employees, but employees of
ABC, and therefore were liable for trespass because they acted beyond the scope of the
consent given by Food Lion).
95. See Logan, Masked Media, supra note 25,passim.
96. Privacy suffers because most torts that affect newsgathering are (1) not designed
specifically to protect personal privacy but to protect other interests, (2) too narrow to address
the wide range of media misbehaviors committed while gathering the news, or (3) interpreted
in ways that undervalue the importance of privacy. For further analysis of the various torts
1998]
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1. Trespass
Trespass is relatively effective at protecting plaintiffs from
newsgathering that interferes with their interests in private property, at
least in certain circumstances. Trespass protects a plaintiff from
physical intrusions into the home or other private locations in which
the plaintiff has a possessory interest,97 thereby giving legal sanction to
the notion that "a man's home is his castle."
Trespass is effective at preventing reporters from entering homes
without permission because liability is relatively certain once the
defendant enters private property.98 Tort law has already made the
decision that property interests, at least in this limited sphere, outweigh
the interests of others in entering the property for their own purposes,
even if they do no harm to the property.99 No amorphous weighing
and balancing of intangible interests need be undertaken.' 0
However, trespass is too limited in scope to provide a general
remedy against intrusive newsgathering, and the tort is an ineffective
weapon against the rather ingenious ways that reporters gain access to
private property.'' First, trespass is designed to protect property; it
only incidentally protects privacy. Trespass protects privacy by
creating a physical zone of separation from others; it protects the
individual's right to be let alone, but only so long as he is within the
boundaries of his own property.0 2 As a practical corollary, trespass
that affect investigative reporters, see John W. Wade, The Tort Liability of Investigative
Reporters, 37 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1984).
97. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 163.
98. See LeBel, Getting the News, supra note 17, at 1159 ("Historically, the tort of
trespass to land has been one of the most formalistic causes of action.").
99. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 163; see also Sandra B. Baron et al., Tortious
Interference: The Limits of Common Law Liability for Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. L.J. 1027, 1066 (1996) (discussing the relative predictability of trespass claims as
compared to tortious interference with contract claims).
100. Some have argued for a privilege to trespass in order to gather newsworthy
information. See David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering on
Private Property, 84 CoLuM. L. REv. 1298 (1984); Deckle McLean, Recognizing the
Reporter's Right to Trespass, 9 COMM. & LAW, Oct. 1987, at 31; Note, And Forgive Them
Their Trespasses: Applying the Defense of Necessity to the Criminal Conduct of the
Newsgatherer, 103 HARV. L. REv. 890 (1990). These arguments, however, have not made
much headway in the courts. See cases cited supra note 83; see also FRANKLIN &
ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 398 ("Attempts to assert a constitutional defense to a trespass
action usually are rejected summarily.').
101. See McClurg, supra note 25, at 990. "One lesson of modem privacy law in the
tort arena is that if you expect legal protection for your privacy, you should stay inside your
house with the blinds closed." Id.
102. Some cases, for example, refused to grant a wife a trespass action because she
had no possessory interest in land. See, e.g., Young v. Westem & A.R. Co., 148 S.E. 414,
417 (Ga. Ct. App. 1929).
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provides no protection for newsgathering that takes place on public
property. Thus, trespass is no protection at all from the relentless
hounding and harassment by the press that often makes celebrities and
individuals caught up in public controversies prisoners in their
homes."13
More significantly, even when newsgathering occurs on private
property, trespass largely fails to protect privacy from one of the most
common types of intrusive newsgathering: surreptitious
surveillance."4 The usual scenario in surreptitious surveillance cases
is that a plaintiff consents to the entry of a journalist for a limited
purpose that the journalist exceeds, or consents without realizing that
the journalist is a journalist. In Desnick v. American Broadcasting
Cos., journalists gained information about an ophthalmology clinic by
having individuals pose as patients."°5 When the duped doctors sued
for trespass, they found their claim firmly rejected.0 6 Their trespass
action failed because they consented to the entry of the pseudo-
patients, even though they would not have consented had they known
the patients' true identities.0 7 This line of reasoning, which has been
followed by a number of courts, 8 prevents trespass actions from
being useful against surreptitious surveillance, one of the most
common types of intrusive newsgathering, °9 and one that directly
affects plaintiffs' privacy in nonpublic locations." 0
103. Trespass also offers little protection from electronic as opposed to physical
invasions.
104. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc., v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984
F. Supp. 923, 929, 937-40 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (upholding a jury verdict against ABC for its
actions involving an expos6 of Food Lion which used surreptitious surveillance, though
reducing the amount of damages).
105. 44 F.3d 1345, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995).
106. Seeid.at 1352.
107. See id. For further discussion of Desnick, see infra notes 214-222 and
accompanying text.
108. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745,746 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also Rand v.
NBC, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1989, at 22; Walsh, supra note 30, at 1127-28 (discussing limits
of trespass actions).
109. This same doctrine may also place limits on trespass law's ability to curb a
second type of intrusive newsgathering technique that has gained ascendance with the advent
of "reality television": ride-alongs. Reporters often accompany police and other emergency
personnel to obtain a first-hand portrait of people in crisis situations. No trespass action is
available when reporters film events that occur in public, but courts have been more hostile to
media defendants who accompany police and emergency personnel into private homes. See
generally Rex S. Heinke & Susan Scheiber Edelman, Police and Emergency "Ride-
Alongs"-Is Viewer Excitement Worth the Risk?, ENT. L. REP., Dec. 1995, at 3 (1995); Elsa
Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals"--The Outlawing of
Police/Media Home Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 325 (1995).
Often, an issue in these cases is whether the occupant of the home effectively consented to
the entry of the reporters. See, e.g., Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v.
1998]
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2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Unlike trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress does
protect the dignity of the individual. Yet intentional infliction does not
specifically protect the right to be let alone. In order to make out a
case for intentional infliction, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress
by engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct.1 '
A key problem with this tort in the newsgathering context is that
plaintiffs can rarely prove that the defendant's conduct was "so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.""'  Abusive
newsgathering, whether it takes the form of stalking a target or lying to
gain access to a target's most initiative secrets, is so common that it
becomes very difficult to argue that it is abnormal, unusual, or beyond
the public's expectations of press behavior.
A second problem with suing for emotional distress is that the
plaintiff must prove that the distress suffered was "severe."'" 3 The
comments to the Restatement definition of intrusion state that a cause
of action should be available "only where the distress inflicted is so
severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.""' 4 This
requirement can be very difficult to overcome."'
Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs could sue government officials
who allowed film crew to accompany them on search of private home); Ayeni v. CBS Inc.,
848 F Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y 1994) (occupant objected to filming, but assumed film crews
were government agents searching her home); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (plaintiff allowed filming in her home in the aftermath of a domestic abuse
incident only because she assumed the camera crew was filming for the district attorney's
office; trial court dismissed case as barred by plaintiff's consent); United States v. Sanusi, 813
F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y 1992); Rogers v. Buckel, 615 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992);
Magenis v. Fisher Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
110. See also Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976) (finding
implied consent to entry of journalists into private home, the site of a fatal fire, due to the
custom of journalists accompanying law enforcement officials to disaster sites). But see
Green Valley Sch. Inc., v. Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(rejecting this "implied consent by custom" defense for reporters who accompanied police on
raid at boarding school).
S111. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 46. See generally DAVID A. ELDER, THE
LAW OF PRIVACY 27-31 (1991) (discussing differences between intentional infliction and
intrusion). Journalists are almost never held liable for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 421-23.
112. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 46 cmt. d. The intrusion tort, in contrast, requires
only that the defendant's conduct be highly offensive to a reasonable person. See id. § 652B.
113. Seeid. §46cmt.j.
114. Id.
115. See In re Medical Lab. Management Consultants, 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D.
Ariz. 1996); Berger v. CNN, 24 Media L. Rptr. 1757, 1762 (D. Mont. 1996); Pemberton v.
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First Amendment complications introduced by the Supreme
Court are a third problem facing plaintiffs suing for intentional
infliction based on intrusive newsgathering techniques.116 In Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, the Supreme Court held that a public figure
plaintiff may not sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress
without proving that the publisher of the allegedly outrageous
statements knew or had reason to know of their falsity and
outrageousness."7 The Hustler case arguably should not apply to suits
based on newsgathering methods. The publication at issue in Hustler
was a clearly labelled parody advertisement depicting Reverend Jerry
Falwell having sex in an outhouse with his mother." 8 Hence, Hustler
was based on the content of the defendant's publication rather than the
methods used to obtain it. Moreover, the Hustler Court explicitly
required that plaintiffs suing the media for intentional infliction must
prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact, a requirement
that makes no sense in regard to the newsgathering as opposed to the
news dissemination context. 19  Even if Hustler does place
constitutional limits on suing for intentional infliction for intrusive
newsgathering methods, its holding was limited to public officials and
public figures. 20 Thus, private figure plaintiffs are arguably not
hindered in bringing suits for intrusive newsgathering under an
intentional infliction theory.'
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (illustrating extreme
facts in an employment case). On the other hand, at least one decision has imposed liability
for intentional infliction, but not for intrusion, where the plaintiff was harassed by
photographers in a public area. See Muratore v. M/S Scom PRINCE, 656 F. Supp. 471, 480-
83 (D. Me. 1987), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir.
1988).
116. See generally ROBERT C. POsT, CoNsTrrmoNAL DOMAiNS 119-78 (1995); Paul
A. LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech ": A
Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 315 (1989);
Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
Falwell, 20 AR1i. ST. L.J. 423 (1988).
117. 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
118. Seeid.at48.
119. See id. at 56. One of the key factors in Hustler was that the Court did not want to
allow the plaintiff to avoid the obstacles of defamation law by simply picking an alternative
tort theory. See id.
120. Seeid. at57.
121. Even so, at least four Supreme Court Justices in Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501
U.S. 663 (1990), believed that the actual malice limitation should apply even in a suit based
on the method the reporter used to gather the story. See id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The reporter in Cohen obtained the information for his story by promising a source
anonymity. See id. at 665. After the reporter breached the promise, the source sued. See id.
The dissenting justices viewed the cases as govemed by Hustler because enforcing the
reporter's promise would have had an effect on his ability to publish the newsworthy
information he obtained. See id. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These justices therefore
1998]
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Although the holding of Hustler is narrow, its rhetoric is
expansive. Hustler discussed the perils of allowing states to apply
"inherent[ly] subjective[]" standards like '[o]utrageousness' in the
area of political and social discourse" because such standards allow
juries "to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. ' 122 If
this logic is applied broadly, it poses a serious threat to states' ability to
impose tort liability, including liability for invasion of privacy, on any
form of speech based on its "offensiveness." Regardless, the
limitations of tort doctrines, coupled with constitutional uncertainty,
make intentional infliction an unimportant remedy in newsgathering
cases.
3. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Unlike trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the tort that punishes public disclosure of private facts.23 is designed to
remedy invasion of privacy.'24 This tort (commonly referred to as the
"private facts tort") ostensibly provides a remedy for disclosures of
tre but private information about the plaintiff.25 The private facts
tort, however, is not a viable weapon against media intrusions.'26
would have imposed limits on a state's ability to give a citizen recovery for a reporter's
breach of a promise to keep his identity confidential. Thus, some caution may be warranted
in concluding that Hustler does not apply more generally to cases based on newsgathering.
122. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55.
123. This section does not include a separate discussion of libel. Libel protects
privacy interests only to the extent that they overlap with reputational interests, which, given
that defamatory statements must be false, is minimal. Moreover, of all the torts that affect the
media, libel is probably the most difficult for plaintiffs to prove. For a comprehensive
treatment of this topic, see David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 487 (1991) [hereinafter Anderson, Libel Law]. Likewise, this section does not
include a separate discussion of the tort of false light invasion of privacy, since false light is
subject to the same constitutional obstacles as defamation. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 388 (1967) (holding that the Constitution precludes the application of false light "in the
absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth'").
124. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652D. This branch of invasion of privacy is
included under the heading "Publicity Given to Private Life" but is commonly referred to as
the private facts tort or the public disclosure of private facts tort. See id.
125. See id.
126. See DAviD A. ANDERSON, USING PEOPLE 13 (1998) (forthcoming) [hereinafter
ANDERSON, USING PEOPLE] ("People who sue for unwelcome media disclosures about their
private lives almost always lose .... The law says unwarranted disclosure of private facts is
a tort, but in practice the courts almost always accept the defendant's argument that the matter
disclosed was already public, was not sufficiently offensive, or was a matter of legitimate
public concern."); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and
Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1175 (1992) ("Interring the [private facts]
tort ... represents no more than the formalizing of a deed already done."); Diane L.
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In order to establish a prima facie case under the private facts
tort, a plaintiff must show that the defendant publicized "a matter
concerning the private life" of the plaintiff and that the matter would
be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and "not of legitimate
public concern!" (or, as some courts term it, not "newsworthy").128
This formulation of the tort poses several obstacles to plaintiffs
seeking a remedy for intrusive newsgathering. The private facts tort
addresses the defendant's dissemination of private information rather
than her misconduct in obtaining the information. 29 Not all intrusive
newsgathering results in dissemination of private information, and
even where it does, the publication of the information (as opposed to
the methods used to obtain it) may not be sufficiently offensive to
justify the imposition of liability under the tort.130 Undoubtedly the
most troublesome element of the tort, however, is the last one:
proving that the information published was not of legitimate public
concern.
131
Courts have had great difficulty in formulating standards for
determining what sorts of information are newsworthy or of legitimate
public concern. This newsworthiness privilege rests on the premise
that the media should not be punished for publishing information
typically considered news. 2  Courts have been unable, however, to
agree on a definition of "news."' 33  Some courts, following the
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis ' Privacy
Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 293 (1982) (noting that despite the increasing number of
claims brought under the private facts tort, "plaintiffs rarely win").
127. RESTA mENT, supra note 14, § 652D cmt. a ("Publicity' ... means that the
matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that
the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.").
The tort is primarily aimed at dissemination by the mass media.
128. See FRANKLiN & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 348. Although the elements vary
slightly by state, the Restatement formulation is one of the most common.
129. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 978 (1989) [hereinafter Post, Social
Foundations] ("[Intrusion concerns the physical actions of a defendant, whereas public
disclosure involves the dissemination of information.").
130. For example, bugging a professor's office to listen to a conversation with a
student about defamation law is highly offensive behavior, publishing the conversation may
not be.
131. Some courts treat this as an element that plaintiff must prove; others treat it as a
defense or a privilege. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975)
(treating it as a privilege).
132. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652D cmt. d; W. PAGE KEEroN ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ONTHE LAW OEToRTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
133. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958) ("[O]nce
the character of an item as news is established, it is neither feasible nor desirable for a court
to make a distinction between news for information and news for entertainment in
determining the extent to which publication is privileged."); see also David Logan, Tort Law
1998)
HeinOnline  -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 199 1998-1999
TULANE LA WREVIEW
Restatement, recognize that what is newsworthy is "in the last analysis
... a matter of the community mores" and therefore give great
deference to jury determinations on this issue.134
A more popular approach, however, is to define newsworthiness
descriptively.135 Under this approach, courts "emphasize the public's
actual interest in information, not ... what ought to interest the
public.' 36  Because courts are understandably loath to second guess
the media's editorial judgments about what is news, courts routinely
defer to media judgments about newsworthiness. 37 In essence,
therefore, the media create their "own definition of news, ' '13' and as a
consequence an individual's privacy receives almost no protection
from the public's insatiable demand for information.
Even if a plaintiff could overcome the common law obstacles, the
constitutional ones are almost insurmountable. Most commentators
agree that the Supreme Court's most recent private-facts decision,
Florida Star v. B.JE, makes it almost impossible for states to impose
liability on the publication of truthful information.'39 In Florida Star, a
and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Prrr. L. Rcv. 493, 548 (1990)
[hereinafter Logan, Tort Law] (discussing the difficulty of determining newsworthiness).
134. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129 (observing that the standard is based on the "customs and
conventions of the community"); see also Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762,
773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that "the jury was the proper body to answer the question
whether the article was newsworthy or whether it extended beyond the bounds of decency").
135. See Logan, Tort Law, supra note 133, at 549; Comment, The Right of Privacy:
Normative-Descriptive Confusion in Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. Cmn. L. REv. 722,
725 (1963).
136. Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First
Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOwA L. REv. 185, 196
(1979).
137. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308-09 (10th Cir. 1981)
(applying a "reasonable editor" standard of newsworthiness); Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Co.,
712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986) (refusing to second guess media's determination of
newsworthiness).
138. See KEETON, supra note 132, § 117.
139. 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
decision "obliterate[s] one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the
tort of the publication of private facts"); see also David A. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 71, 102-04 (1990) (arguing that a private litigant will almost never be
able to establish the constitutional requirements set forth in Florida Star); G. Michael
Harvey, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
2385, 2416 (1992); Jacqueline R. Rolfs, Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of
the Endfor the Tort ofPublic Disclosure, 1105, 1124-27 (1990).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly evaded the question whether states can
constitutionally impose liability on the publication of truthful but privacy invading
information. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), for example, the Court
refused to decide whether "the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from
unwanted publicity," and instead decided merely that states could not impose liability on the
publication of accurate information obtained from open court records. Id. at 491. Likewise,
in Florida Star, the Court sidestepped the larger question whether truthful publication is
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rape victim sued after her name mistakenly appeared in the police beat
section of a local newspaper.4 ' B.J.F. was a highly sympathetic
plaintiff. After her name was published, a man called her mother to
say he would rape B.J.F. again.' As a result, B.J.F. moved from her
home and sought psychiatric counseling. 42 Moreover, the newspaper,
which obtained her name from an erroneously released police report,
published B.J.F.'s name in violation of its own policy of
nondisclosure."'
The Supreme Court nonetheless denied B.J.F. recovery, holding
that where the press "publishes truthfiul information which it has
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... ""
Read in context, however, the Court's decision indicates that rarely
will privacy be deemed a "state interest of the highest order,"' 45 rarely
will a private matter fail to be "of public significance,"'146 and rarer still
will information be deemed "unlawfully obtained" or not part of the
public record.'4 7 Thus, plaintiffs who wish to attack media intrusions
into their private lives would do well to look to other theories of
recovery than private facts.
always constitutionally protected and instead framed its decision narrowly, barring tort
liability under the facts of the case. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
The majority opinion stops short of saying that states may never impose liability for the
publication of truthful information. In fact, the Court explicitly acknowledged that "press
freedom and privacy rights are both 'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns
of our society,"' thereby implying that a strong cultural commitment to privacy prevents its
abolition. Id. at 533. But the Court's actions speak louder than its words, and the outcomes
of its privacy decisions indicate that the Court's commitment to privacy (at least when it
conflicts with speech and press freedoms) is at best weak and nebulous. Because other
commentators have already diagnosed the many flaws in the private facts tort, I do not
attempt to recount them all here.





145. In Florida Star, the Court conceded that protecting the privacy and safety of
sexual offense victims and encouraging them to report sexual offenses were "highly
significant interests," but the Court nonetheless found that imposing liability against the
newspaper that published B.J.F.'s name was "too precipitous a means of advancing these
interests." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537.
146. The Court found that the news article at issue in Florida Star concerned a matter
of public significance because "the article generally, as opposed to the specific identity within
it, involved a matter of paramount public import: the commission, and investigation, of a
violent crime which had been reported to authorities." Id. at 537.
147. The Supreme Court found that B.J.F.'s name was lawfully obtained despite the
fact that the police department's release of the information violated a Florida statute, see id. at
536, and despite the fact that the newspaper violated both the Florida statute and its own
internal policies by publishing the information. Id. at 533.
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4. Other Theories, Novel and Otherwise
Plaintiffs' lawyers have recently been successful in deploying
novel theories to circumvent the flaws in more traditional tort
doctrines. Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.141 is a good example
of this phenomenon. Food Lion was yet another case prompted by an
undercover investigation conducted by Prime Time Live.149 Working
in conjunction with a union that was attempting to gain a foothold in
Food Lion grocery stores, Prime Time Live employees falsified their
resumes and lied about their identities to get jobs at Food Lion.'
Once employed, the Prime Time Live employees obtained graphic
footage of various unsanitary meat-handling practices.
After the Prime Time Live investigation aired, Food Lion sued.
Food Lion's high-profile legal team initially pursued fourteen different
claims against ABC, including wiretapping, racketeering, civil
conspiracy, unfair and deceptive trade practices, intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, negligent supervision, trespass, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty."5 ' Although the Court dismissed most of
these claims before trial,' 2 Food Lion was ultimately successful in its
fraud, trespass and breach of loyalty claims. 5 The most controversial
of these was the breach of loyalty claim. The gist of this claim had
little to do with the stomach-turning expos6 of Food Lion's practices.
Instead, the claim was that the pseudo-employees from Prime Time
Live were not loyal to their employer, Food Lion. This theory was
nothing but a fiction: Food Lion's actual injury was the damaging
publicity it received, but Food Lion could not pursue a defamation
action because much of the information broadcast by Prime Time Live
was true.1
5 4
Nonetheless, this case represents a disturbing trend in
newsgathering law. The clever plaintiff's lawyers in Food Lion,
having seen the difficulty in establishing a viable claim for defamation,
invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress based
on newsgathering practices, pressed (or twisted) other tort theories into
service. By doing so, the lawyers turned the focus from Food Lion's
own misconduct and were able to focus solely on the elaborate pattern
148. 887 F Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
149. See id. at 813.
150. See id. at 814-15.
151. See FoodLion, 887 F. Supp. at 817.
152. Seeid. at821.
153. See Russ Baker, Damning Undercover Tactics as "Fraud", CoLUM. JoURNAUISM
RaV., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 28.
154. Seeid.
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of deception the ABC employees used to gain access to their stores. 5 '
Despite the controversy over Food Lion and similar cases, however,
the question remains whether cases decided on such narrow grounds
really have much application to subsequent cases.
IV. INTRUSION: A TORT WORTH FIXING
The tort of intrusion has never lived up to its potential. The
intrusion tort is not, as some hoped it would be, "the last effective
weapon in [the] fight for privacy."' 6 Nor is it the threat to press
freedom envisioned by others. 5 7  Instead, courts have so narrowly
limited the tort that it is largely toothless in the face of an increasingly
intrusive press. At the same time, this vaguely defined tort remains as
an ominous reminder to the press that although liability is unlikely, it is
not impossible. As the law currently stands, the intrusion tort is a
disaster: it provides neither effective privacy protection nor clear
guidelines to the media as to what newsgathering methods are
appropriate.
A. Intrusion in Theory
The intrusion tort seems to be ideally suited to deal with the
problem of intrusive newsgathering.5 8  Intrusion is one of four torts
155. Other theories applied in newsgathering cases include tortious interference and
fraud. For cases on tortious interference, see, for example, Risenhoover v. England, 24
Media L. Rptr. 1705 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Triplex v. Riley, 900 S.W2d 716 (Tex. 1995).
156. Harry S. Raleigh, Jr., Case Comment, Invasion of Privacy-Unreasonable
Intrusion-A Weapon Against Intrusions upon Our Shrinking Right of Privacy, 47 NoTRE
DAMEL. REV. 1067, 1077 (1972).
157. See Mary Ann L. Wymore, Modernizing the Law of Privacy: Challenging the
Validity of the Intrusion Tort and Presenting Arguments for Its Elimination, 40 FED. BAR
NEws & J. 375, 378 (1993) (arguing that "[t]he common law tort of intrusion, if unchecked,
poses one of the greatest risks to the freedom afforded the press"). Wymore argues that the
tort of intrusion should be eliminated because "tortious or criminal activities of journalists
while news gathering are better addressed within the rubric of the torts or crimes committed"
and intrusion as it currently exists "is duplicative of the privacy tort of public disclosure of
private facts." Id. at 375. Although Ms. Wymore makes a valid point about the vagueness of
the tort posing a threat to the media, the first of her arguments nonetheless fails for the
reasons discussed in the section above, namely that the various other torts that may affect
newsgathering do so only haphazardly at best. Even if one concedes that the second
argument is true (which is questionable, because despite some overlap, intrusion retains
independent validity by focusing primarily on the gathering rather than the publication of
news), the argument may support doctrinal reform rather than outright abolition of the
intrusion tort, particularly if one sees privacy as a value worth protecting. See also James E.
King & Frederick T. Muto, Compensatory Damages for Newsgatherer Torts: Toward a
Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 919 (1981).
158. Several of the illustrations of potentially tortious behavior provided in the
Restatement deal with media intrusions. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652B illus. 1, 5-
7.
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that are designed specifically to provide redress for invasion of
privacy."9 Unlike the other three invasion of privacy torts, however,
intrusion does not focus on the defendant's publication of privacy-
invading information.16 Instead, intrusion is defined broadly enough
that it encompasses a wide range of newsgathering behaviors.
Intrusion is also capable of surmounting the First Amendment barriers
that plague other privacy torts because it focuses on newsgathering
rather than publication.
Intrusion is designed to protect an individual's sphere of privacy,
whether spatial or psychological,' from the obtrusive and obnoxious
delving of others.'62 Many courts have adopted the Restatement
definition of intrusion. Under this definition, both media and
nonmedia defendants'63 will be liable for intrusion if they
159. Although Warren and Brandeis are credited with the idea of imposing tort
liability for invasion of privacy, it was Dean Prosser who divided the tort into four distinct
categories: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, (2) publicity that places the
plaintiff in a false light, (3) publication of private facts, and (4) commercial exploitation of
the plaintiff's name or likeness. See Prosser, supra note 14, at 384-88. Prosser's fourfold
division has become integral to any discussion of the privacy torts and is reflected in the
Restatement. Some commentators have questioned the wisdom of Prosser's categorization.
See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.YU. L. REv. 962, 1006 (1964) (arguing that invasion of privacy should be a
single tort designed to protect human dignity); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoNTmp. PROBS. 326, 329 (1966) (arguing that
the tort's only value is to protect against commercial appropriations).
160. "Publicity" is an element of both the private facts tort and the false light tort. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, §§ 652D-652E (discussing the private facts tort and the false
light tort, respectively). The term denotes "that the matter is made public, by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." Id. § 652D cmt. a. To call
commercial appropriation a privacy tort is something of a misnomer, because it is as much
concemed with protecting a property-based right to make money by selling one's name or
likeness as it is with the plaintiff's emotional well being. See id. § 652C cmt. a. Publication
is not technically an element of the commercial appropriation tort, which makes a defendant
liable for "appropriat[ing] to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another." Id.
§ 652C. As a practical matter, however, a plaintiff who wishes to sue a media defendant for
commercial appropriation will almost always claim that the defendant deprived him of his
rights by publishing his name or likeness. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the right to use a person's voice is a property right that is
protected under California law, and that actor Bette Midler had a cause of action against a
company that used an imitation of her voice without her permission, because "[t]o
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity"). Similarly, in White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), Vanna White, the plaintiff, argued that a commercial
advertisement using a robot dressed in an evening gown, standing in front of a "Wheel of
Fortune" game board, violated her right to publicity. See id. at 1397.
161. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705,711 (Ala. 1983).
162. See generally KEErON, supra note 132, § 117; ELDER, supra note Ill, at 15-147.
163. Although this Article focuses on media intrusions, most intrusion cases are aimed
at other types of defendants. See, e.g., Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co., 223 A.2d 405 (Conn. Cir.
Ct. 1956) (suing debt collector for making harassing telephone calls); Hamberger v. Eastman,
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"intentionally intrude[], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns ... [and] the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."'"
Publication is not an element of the tort.16
As defined by the Restatement, the intrusion tort has several
distinctive features. First, the Restatement defines the protected sphere
of privacy broadly. This broad definition is consistent with the tort's
initial purpose, which was "to fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance,
the intentional infliction of mental distress, and whatever remedies
there may be for the invasion of constitutional rights.' 66  As
conceptualized, the intrusion tort protects against physical intrusions as
well as electronic intrusions and addresses conduct such as
wiretapping, bugging with microphones, and peering into windows. 67
More importantly, the intrusion tort recognizes that an individual's
privacy interest has a psychological component,168 and thus a
defendant who invades this interest may be liable even for intrusions
that occur outside the plaintiff's home or other property in which she
has a possessory interest. 69
Because the intrusion tort defines the right to solitude and
seclusion so broadly, it potentially reaches the wide range of
newsgathering methods that the media currently employ. 7° Case law
206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1965) (suing a landlord for electronic eavesdropping); Sutherland v.
Kroeger, Co., 110 S.E.2d 716 (W. Va. 1959) (suing grocery store for searching a shopping
bag).
164. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652B.
165. See id. § 652B cmts. a, b. See generally ELDER, supra note 111, at 32-33.
166. Prosser, supra note 14, at 392.
167. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652B cmt. b.
168. See ELDER, supra note 111, at 43 (citing cases recognizing a right to
"psychological solitude.").
169. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652B cmt. c. The Restatement comments
give little guidance as to how substantial an interest an individual has in privacy in a public
place. While it makes clear that there is no liability for observing or even photographing a
person on a public street, there may still be some matters about the plaintiff that are "private,"
such as "his underwear or lack of it." Id. Further comments indicate that some behavior that
is not intrusive initially may become so if "repeated with such persistence and frequency as to
amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that it becomes a substantial burden to his
existence. .. ." Id. § 652B cmt. d.
170. Indeed, several of the Restatement illustrations of actionable intrusions deal with
newsgathering by the media. For examples of these, see id. § 652B illus. 1 (reporter takes
photo of woman in hospital without permission); id. § 652B illus. 2 (photographer makes
constant harassing phone calls to "a lady of social prominence" that he wants to photograph;
arguably, this is not a media defendant); id. § 652B illus. 7 (photographer takes picture of
woman's skirt blown over her head when exiting a "fun house"). Note that this last
illustration comes from Daily Tines Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964), in
which the plaintiff successfully sued the newspaper that published the photograph. Some of
these illustrations seem mild compared to the type of newsgathering that goes on today.
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at least suggests that surreptitious surveillance aimed at an individual's
private affairs or targeted to obtain entrance to the private areas of his
home or business may constitute an actionable intrusion."' Constant
and unabated hounding by the media, especially when accompanied
by conduct that either endangers the safety of the target or makes use
of high-tech eavesdropping devices may also constitute an actionable
intrusion.1 7' The tort requires only that there be an intrusion; it does
not specify what form such intrusion might take. In theory, at least,
intrusion seems like the remedy of choice for plaintiffs whose privacy
is invaded by intrusive newsgathering methods.
Another reason that plaintiffs might choose the intrusion tort to
address intrusive newsgathering is that publication is not an element of
the tort. In most cases, intrusion focuses on the methods used to
gather information rather than on the publication of the information
itself. Thus, the intrusion plaintiff need not prove that the tort
withstands the highest levels of constitutional scrutiny traditionally
applied to publication-based torts. 73  Instead, intrusion is merely a
"generally applicable law" that imposes an incidental burden on
newsgathering, and therefore surmounts any First Amendment
obstacles it encounters.'74
Although the intrusion tort broadly defines the right to privacy,
the tort places only minor limitations on the media's right to gather
news. The tort recognizes that fine distinctions may be required to
distinguish an unwarranted intrusion from the "inevitable
concomitants of life in an industrial and densely populated society.""17
The right to privacy is not, nor could it be, absolute. 176 Therefore, an
intrusion is only actionable if it would be highly offensive to a
171. The most famous example is Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.
1971). See discussion infra Part III; see also In re King World Prods., Inc., 898 F.2d 56 (6th
Cir. 1980).
172. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998 (2d Cir. 1973) (allowing an injunction,
although limiting its scope, against a paparazzi photographer who was hounding and taking
pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and her children); Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp.
1413, 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining defendants, who followed plaintiffs and filmed them
using a camera with a zoom lens and a shotgun mike, from continuing to intrude on the
plaintiffs' privacy).
173. See discussion infra Part III.
174. See discussion infra Part III.
175. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y 1970) (holding that
wire-tap surveillance can create a claim for intrusion).
176. See Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D.S.C. 1966). See
generally ELDER, supra note 11I, at 16-17.
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reasonable person. 77 Absent unusually obtrusive behavior, a reporter
will not be liable for observing or even for photographing matters that
occur in public places. Moreover, as newsgathering techniques that
were once considered objectionable become more common, it
becomes less likely that the public will view them as highly offensive
and correspondingly less likely that liability will be imposed for them.
Thus, in some sense, the media are able to define the scope of legal
protection by its own practices.
B. Intrusion in Practice
Even though the intrusion tort appears to be a potentially
effective weapon against intrusive newsgathering, in practice the tort
fails to provide a reliable remedy for victims of intrusions. Indeed, the
very breadth of the tort may be its undoing.
1. Doctrinal Flaws
One has only to look at the overall success rate of plaintiffs who
sue the media to see that intrusion is neither the threat to the press nor
the panacea for privacy that some have envisioned. Although
intrusive newsgathering methods are becoming more prevalent,
victims of paparazzi attacks or undercover investigations rarely sue for
intrusion; even when they do sue, their success rate is abysmal. A
cursory overview of newsgathering cases reveals that plaintiffs rarely
prevail against the media. In fact, most never even get past the hurdle
of summary judgment.178 During the period from 1986-1996, a study
by the Libel Defense Resource Center found that defendants prevailed
on summary judgment motions in intrusion cases almost ninety
percent of the time.7 9 Even those plaintiffs who did prevail at trial
often found their awards reversed or reduced on appeal. 8 ° On the
surface, therefore, there seems to be a gap between tort theory, which
ostensibly provides a right of recovery, and reality, in which most
plaintiffs lose-and even more never sue.
But win/loss rates alone do not tell the whole story. One
explanation for plaintiffs' losses is that plaintiffs tend to misuse the
177. See RESTATE ENT, supra note 14, § 652B; see also Miller v. National Broad. Co.,
232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that "numerous factors" go into this
inquiry).
178. See generally Susan Grogan Faller, Summary Judgment Without Discovery, in
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tort.18' Because intrusion is so vague, it lends itself to what one might
call "kitchen sink" pleading. 182 In other words, plaintiffs tend to plead
intrusion along with a host of other tort theories, hoping one of the
theories will be successful, even if most are dismissed at an early stage
of litigation.'8 3 Plaintiffs also sue for intrusion in cases in which they
appear more concerned with the subsequent publication of the
information obtained than with the methods used to obtain that
information. Not surprisingly, judges are not favorably disposed at the
outset to plaintiffs' intrusion claims. Given that many plaintiffs follow
this same strategy,'84 and thus will have the majority of their claims
dismissed before trial,18 1 the lack of plaintiffs' victories against the
media are not inevitably a bad sign for plaintiffs; perhaps it indicates
that courts are merely sorting meritless theories from legitimate
theories.
This explanation, however, still fails to fully account for
plaintiffs' poor track record. When patterns in the court's treatment of
actual intrusion cases are examined, it is clear that the lack of
plaintiffs' victories is symptomatic of larger doctrinal flaws. The first,
and perhaps most important flaw, is that the use of intrusion has been
limited by a relatively mechanistic approach to intrusions in public
181. See Kovner & Dorsen, supra note 4, at 781.
182. "Kitchen sink pleading" may be a rational strategy for individual plaintiffs,
because it multiplies the chances that at least one of the theories pleaded will get past pretrial
procedural motions and give them a chance to make it to trial against a media defendant. In
the long term, however, kitchen sink pleading strategies may desensitize courts to legitimate
claims of invasion of privacy and, if nothing else, distort win/loss rates.
183. See Logan, Masked Media, supra note 25, at 169 (discussing this phenomenon).
184. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (alleging fourteen different theories against Prime lime Live after its
undercover investigation of unsanitary conditions at the grocery store chain). These claims
were based on the methods Prime lime Live used to obtain the story. Food Lion sought leave
to amend its complaint to add a defamation claim after the statute of limitations ran out.
Food Lion apparently based this claim on the argument that outtakes from Prime Time Live's
broadcast suggested that some of the footage was "staged." The judge found that the
outtakes did not support a libel action. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 165
F.R1D. 454, 457 (M.D.N.C. 1996). See generally Baker, supra note 153, at 28. Food Lion
might have sued for invasion of privacy by publication of private facts, but the constitutional
limits on this tort are so severe as to make this strategy extremely difficult See ANDERSON,
UsING PEOPLE, supra note 126 (arguing that the private facts tort is completely ineffectual in
combating media abuses and that the Supreme Court must revise its First Amendment
jurisprudence in this area before states can impose liability for publication of private facts);
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,541 (1989).
185. The Food Lion court dismissed all but the plaintiff's trespass, fraud, civil
conspiracy and unfair trade practices theories prior to trial. See Food Lion, 951 F. Supp. at
1233.
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places.'86 Intrusion, developed specifically to fill the gaps in trespass
law, was meant to protect privacy in the absence of a discernible
property interest. But most courts refuse to hold defendants liable for
intrusions that occur in public places,'87 even though in theory they
should do so in cases in which the defendant's actions were unusually
obtrusive, highly embarrassing to the plaintiff, or otherwise invasive of
reasonable privacy interests.'88 This doctrine has superficial appeal,
for individuals only have a limited expectation of privacy in public
places. However, applying the "public places" limitation categorically
means that persons forego privacy rihts in all public places and
therefore have no recourse against constant and obtrusive
surveillance.'89 With this limitation, intrusion becomes virtually
186. See generally ELDER, supra note 111, at 45 (citing cases that refused to hold
defendants liable for observing or recording events that occurred in public places).
187. See Dempsey v. National Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927, 930-31 (D. Me. 1988);
Muratore v. MIS Scom PRNcE, 656 F. Supp. 471, 483 (D. Me. 1987); Pierson v. News
Group Publications, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635, 640 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co.,
253 P.2d 441,444 (Cal. 1953); Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); Nelson v.
Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977). But see Summers v. Bailey, 55 F.3d 1564,
1567 (1 Ith Cir. 1995) (stating, in a nonmedia case, that liability can be imposed for "prying"
and surveillance in public intended to frighten or torment plaintiff); Holman v. Central Ark.
Broad. Co., 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973);
Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (indicating that "unabated
hounding" might constitute intrusion, but that "aggressive and possibly abrasiye" methods
used by reporters would not), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986);
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); Mark v. Seattle Times, 635
P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981). Professor Andrew McClurg convincingly argues for expanding tort
liability for intrusions in public places. See McClurg, supra note 25. Professor McClurg,
however, is concerned with intrusions more generally rather than with media intrusions
alone, and when discussing media intrusions, he tends to blur the line between intrusions
resulting from publication of private facts (which should more properly be brought as private
facts cases and would almost certainly face insurmountable First Amendment obstacles) and
intrusions resulting from the methods used to obtain private information (which should be
brought as intrusion cases and which would be constitutionally permissible). See id.
188. For an extreme example of the mechanistic approach, see Butts v. Capital City
Press, Inc., 479 So. 2d 534, 536-37 (La. Ct. App. 1985). On the other hand, some courts
have acknowledged that a plaintiff may have a protected zone of privacy even in public
places. See, e.g., Galella, 487 F.2d at 995; Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (N.D.
I11. 986); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970). "A person does not
automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public place.... ." Id at
771.
189. Some have argued that stalking laws may be applied against the media to prevent
this kind of behavior. See, e.g., Joyce, supra note 49, at 36-37 (reporting that "lawyers say
threats posed by aggressive photographers can be addressed by anti-stalking statutes"); Julie
Miles Walker, Comment, Anti-Stalking Legislation: Does it Protect the Victim Without
Violating the Rights of the Accused?, 71 DENv. U. L. REv. 273, 274 n.8 (1993) (citing Sonya
Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast June 8, 1992)) (stating that an investigative
reporter who seeks out information on a public figure could violate stalking laws); James C.
Wickens, Comment, Michigan ' New Anti-Stalking Laws: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 1994
DEr. C.L. Rnv. 157, 197 (stating that Michigan's anti-stalking statutes have been criticized
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synonymous with trespass, and therefore redundant, except perhaps in
cases involving electronic or other "non-physical" invasions on private
property that do not meet the technical requirements of trespass.
Intrusion's second doctrinal flaw is that courts have blurred the
line between intrusion and private facts in some cases by creating a
newsworthiness privilege to the intrusion tort.' Again, this approach
has intuitive appeal when applied to intrusion cases that are based on
the defendant's behavior in publishing private information. In these
types of cases, courts struggle to accommodate both First Amendment
values and privacy concerns; applying a newsworthiness defense is
probably a step in the right direction. 9' However, some courts have
unquestioningly borrowed the "newsworthiness" doctrine from the
private facts tort and applied it in intrusion cases that are based not on
publication but on newsgathering 92  In doing so, these courts borrow
all the doctrinal problems that plague the private facts tort. The
primary problem lies in defining newsworthiness; the concept of
newsworthiness is itself so vague that most courts simply defer to the
judgments of the media about what is or is not newsworthy.'93
Certainly, the importance of the information that the press is
seeking is sometimes relevant in deciding whether or not an actionable
intrusion has occurred.'94  Yet, as currently applied, the
newsworthiness inquiry is insufficiently nuanced to deal with the
because they could be used against news reporters who have been requested to stay away
from a victim).
190. See Walsh, supra note 30, at 1122-23.
191. Of course, another possible approach would be to force plaintiffs to sue for
publication of private facts rather than intrusion.
192. See supra notes 130-137 and accompanying text.
193. See ANDERSON, USING PEOPLE, supra note 126. Courts also blur the line between
intrusion and private facts when they allow intrusion plaintiffs to recover consequential
damages for the publication of information that has been tortiously obtained. Compare
Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.YS.2d 92 (N.Y App. Div. 1970) (denying damages for
subsequent publication), with Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)
(allowing damages based on subsequent publication). See Walsh, supra note 30, at 1132
(discussing division among courts "regarding the appropriate scope of damages to be
awarded to a victim of unlawful media conduct where there is subsequent publication");
King & Muto, supra note 157, at 935-39. Allowing a plaintiff to recover damages based on
subsequent publication arguably threatens core First Amendment values (the right to publish
truthful information). The Supreme Court has said that the First Amendment protects
publication of truthful information that has been lawfully obtained. See, e.g., Florida Star v.
B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1988); Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1974). Perhaps,
therefore, allowing plaintiffs to recover consequential damages for the publication of
information unlawfully obtained would not violate the First Amendment. Nonetheless,
allowing consequential damages based on publication of intrusively obtained information
raises the specter that plaintiffs will employ newsgathering torts to do an "end run" around
the limitations placed on publication-based torts.
194. See infra Part VI.
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complexity of the problem. Requiring that the information sought be
newsworthy places almost no limitations on what the press can
publish, and when applied in the intrusion context, imposes almost no
limitations on how they obtain information to publish. In adopting a
newsworthiness requirement, courts establish almost insunnountable
doctrinal obstacles to plaintiffs' recoveries and essentially conflate the
intrusion tort with the private facts tort. 9'
A related problem stems from the amorphous nature of the right
protected by the intrusion tort. Courts are uncomfortable with or even
hostile to theories that allow plaintiffs to recover for dignitary
injuries.'96 Courts are more comfortable with property-based theories,
and therefore it is not surprising that plaintiffs seem to have more
success when suing on a property-based theory like trespass.'97 Courts
may be particularly hostile to the rather amorphous right of privacy
when it conflicts with First Amendment values; even though the First
Amendment does not bar liability for newsgathering torts, courts may
still be more hesitant than usual in imposing liability on the media.
This may also explain why judges in this area tend to be heavy-
handed in taking apparent questions of fact away from juries. Judges
may be influenced by the subtle pull of First Amendment values in
media cases,' even though they do not always refer to these values
explicitly.
Coupled with this hostility to dignitary torts, courts also seem to
prefer allowing plaintiffs to recover based on narrow theories rather
than broad ones. In trespass cases, for example, courts realize that the
interest protected is a narrow one, and they need not address broad
questions of social policy. They need merely protect a fairly narrow
interest in property. This factor may explain why Food Lion was
allowed to pursue only relatively narrow theories of recovery against
ABC. Because the case was resolved on narrow grounds, the judge
did not have to make sweeping decisions about the proper balance
between privacy and the press, and the ultimate impact of the decision
195. See Wymore, supra note 157, at 378 (discussing this phenomenon).
196. See Jonathan L. Entin, Privacy Rights and Remedies, 41 CAsE W. RES. L. REV.
689, 692 (1991) ("It is precisely because plaintiffs can recover for psychic injury that some
critics are uncomfortable with the privacy tort."); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 136, 163 (1992) (diagnosing judicial hostility to torts designed to validate
dignitary interests); McClurg, supra note 25, at 1004 (observing that "[r]eview of the case
law discloses ajudicial wariness of-if not outright hostility toward-the invasion of privacy
torts").
197. See, e.g., Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811 (1996); see
also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980)
("[Plrivacy is seldom protected in the absence of some other interest.").
198. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
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ended up being limited to a narrow set of factual circumstances.'99
Arguably, the Food Lion decision only applies when a reporter
engages in an elaborate pattern of deception to gain employment with
a target and then uses information obtained on the job to the detriment
of her employer.
A final doctrinal flaw in the intrusion tort stems from the law's
failure to keep pace with the development of surveillance technology.
Traditionally, courts have refused to hold that filming a plaintiff is any
more objectionable than observing her first-hand or that transmitting
her conversation is any more objectionable than repeating it to a third
party."' There are at least two problems with this line of reasoning.
First, to the extent that privacy is defined by social norns, most people
find it more objectionable to be surreptitiously filmed or to have a
conversation recorded than to have their private conversation repeated
by one of the participants. Second, even if the doctrine made sense
with regard to simple tape recordings of a conversation to which one is
a party, it may not make sense with regard to other types of recording.
There are more ways to conduct surveillance than ever before.
Shotgun mikes can pick up sound from sixty yards away. Cameras
can be hidden in hats; microphones can be strapped under a reporter's
clothing. This new technology therefore gives the media the power to
invade privacy in ways that current doctrine does not fully apprehend.
Taken together, the doctrinal flaws in the intrusion tort undermine
a plaintiffs ability to recover for privacy invasions by the media.
Equally important, these doctrinal flaws create a great deal of
uncertainty about the scope of the tort's coverage. Plaintiffs find it
difficult to determine whether their rights are protected, and the media
have no advance notice regarding the types of newsgathering that will
subject them to tort liability. Thus, the strength of the intrusion tort-
that it is broad enough to cover various types of conduct-may also be
its greatest failure.
2. An Illustration
To demonstrate the uncertainty inherent in the intrusion tort,
consider a hypothetical involving surreptitious surveillance. Assume
that a reporter wants to go undercover with hidden cameras to uncover
evidence of unsanitary conditions in the meatpacking industry. The
reporter has reliable evidence from employees of the plant that
conditions are horrid, but the reporter believes that the story will not
199. Seeid.
200. See McClurg, supra note 25, at 1042.
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garner much attention without pictures. May the reporter go
undercover to gather news without fear of tort liability for intrusion?
The answer is unclear.2"'
The leading cases on intrusive newsgathering point in different
directions. One of the earliest surreptitious surveillance cases is
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.2"2 In Dietemann, two reporters for Life
magazine entered Mr. Dietemann's home under the pretense that they
were sent there by friends to obtain his medical assistance.0 3
Dietemann, a "disabled veteran with little education," diagnosed the
female reporter as suffering from a lump in her breast caused by eating
"rancid butter eleven years, nine months, and seven days" prior to their
meeting.2" Meanwhile, the reporters photographed Dietemann and
recorded all that went on in his home with the use of a hidden camera
and hidden radio transmitter.2 5 At trial, Dietemann received $1,000
for invasion of privacy that resulted in "injury to [his] feelings and
peace of mind."2 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the reporters' actions
constituted an actionable invasion of privacy,207 although the opinion
provides little guidance as to the decisive factors in its decision.20 8
Judge Hufstedler, writing for the court, observed that the intrusion
occurred in the plaintiff's home and that the Life reporters used
subterfuge to gain entrance.0 9 Moreover, the court particularly
emphasized that the reporters recorded and photographed Mr.
Dietemann without his permission using "hidden mechanical
201. Obviously the answer depends to a certain extent on where the plant is located
because tort law varies state by state.
202. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
203. See id. at 245-46. The reporters apparently found out about Mr. Dietemann's
quackery from the police, who were investigating him. See id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925,932 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
207. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 250. The court found it unnecessary to decide
whether the plaintiff's case should have been decided as an intrusion case, a private facts
case, or a more expansive and general right to privacy case. However, at a later point in the
opinion, the court explicitly characterized it as involving an "instancef' of intrusion... into
spheres from which an ordinary man in plaintiff's position could reasonably expect that the
particular defendant should be excluded." Id. (quoting Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704
(D.D.C. 1969).
208. The court refused to extend First Amendment protection to defendants'
newsgathering methods. See discussion supra Part II.
209. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. Note that this behavior would have been
acceptable if engaged in by the police. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)
(holding that subterfuge used by an undercover agent to record a conversation, in which
petitioner made self-incriminating statements, did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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contrivances." '2 ° Yet the decision does not indicate which of these
factors, or which combination of factors, triggered liability. Was it the
fact that the intrusion occurred in Dietemann's home, the most
protected sphere of privacy? Was it that the reporters used a trick to
gain entrance? Or was it merely hostility to new technology and what
were, for the times, innovative newsgathering techniques?
The decision suggests that this last factor may have been the
strongest in favor of liability. The court conceded that "[o]ne who
invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor may
not be what he seems .. ,"211 This language suggests that neither the
fact that the subterfuge occurred in Dietemann's home nor the fact that
the reporters used subterfuge to gain entrance were the primary factors
in its decision. Furthermore, the court stressed that an individual "does
not and should not be required to take the risk that what is heard and
seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or in our modem
world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at large or to any
segment of it that the visitor may select.""21  If the basis for the
decision is solely that the reporters used concealed recording devices,
it is of questionable precedential value. Absent statutory prohibition, a
party to a conversation may record it without consent.213
It is not clear that the use of concealed devices was the sole basis
for the decision. Perhaps the reporters' intrusion would not have been
actionable without the particular factual circumstances that were
present-specifically, the use of subterfuge in the plaintiff's home
coupled with the use of secret recording devices. Despite the
uncertainty, Dietemann at least stands for the proposition that
surreptitious surveillance may lead to liability, and the reporter wishing
to use surreptitious surveillance in such a situation would be wise to
proceed with caution.
On the other hand, several more recent decisions suggest that
using surreptitious surveillance in the hypothetical scenario would not
subject the reporter to liability. For example, contrast Dietemann with
Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos.214  As discussed above,
Desnick involved an undercover investigation of unnecessary cataract
surgeries performed at the Desnick Eye Center, a chain of ophthalmic
clinics performing more than 10,000 surgeries per year.2"5 To obtain
210. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. For further discussion of this subject, see Barnett, supra note 80, at 444.
214. 44F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
215. See id. at 1347; supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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information for the story, Prime Time Live armed seven people with
hidden cameras and sent them to pose as patients seeking eye
exams."' Desnick and two other doctors subsequently sued for
trespass and invasion of privacy based on the undercover methods
used by Prime Tme Live.217
As noted above, the trespass claim failed because the doctors
consented to the entry of the pseudo-patients. In dismissing the
trespass claim, Judge Posner stressed that the "patients" entered
premises that were "open to anyone expressing a desire for opthalmic
services."218 Moreover, the "patients" filmed professional (as opposed
to personal) communications with the doctors and did so in a way that
did not disrupt the plaintiffs' business activities.219 Analogizing the
pseudo-patients to restaurant critics, the court ultimately found that the
defendants had not interfered with any interests that trespass is
designed to protect.2
The court used this same logic to dispose of plaintiffs' invasion
of privacy claim.2 21 Plaintiffs had no viable cause of action for
invasion of privacy because the defendant had neither revealed
intimate facts about them nor recorded intimate conversations.222
Thus, the court seemed to indicate that subterfuge and surreptitious
recording alone will not transform an encounter in a business setting
into an actionable invasion of privacy; at least if the subterfuge is not
elaborate, the encounter occurs in a part of the business that is open to
216. See id. at 1348.
217. In addition, the plaintiffs sued for defamation, wiretapping, and fraud. See id. at
1349-51. The fraud claim is particularly interesting. ABC producers allegedly assured Dr.
Desnick that the story would involve neither ambush interviews nor undercover surveillance;
they also assured him that the coverage would be "fair and balanced." See id. at 1348. Based
on these assurances, Dr. Desnick allowed ABC to enter his Chicago office to film an
operation and to interview doctors, employees, and patients of the Eye Center. See id. Dr.
Desnick alleged that the "false promises" used by ABC to gain access to his office amounted
to fraud. See id. at 1351. Judge Posner rejected this claim, intimating that Desnick could not
have reasonably relied on the promises of the Prime 27me Live producers:
Investigative journalists well known for ruthlessness promise to wear kid gloves.
They break their promise as any person of normal sophistication would expect. If
that is "fraud," it is the kind against which potential victims can easily arm
themselves by maintaining a minimum of skepticism about journalistic goals and
methods.
Id. at 1354.
218. Id. at 1352.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1353.
221. See id. The court treated plaintiffs' complaint as raising both intrusion and
private facts claims. See id.
222. See id.
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the public, and the encounter concerns only business rather than
personal matters.223
How, then, does one explain Food Lion? First, it is important to
remember that Food Lion was not resolved as an invasion of privacy
case; the jury ultimately found that the defendants had committed
trespass, fraud, and breach of loyalty.224 Second, the court explicitly
distinguished Food Lion from Desnick on the ground that the
newsgathering occurred in private areas of the Food Lion stores and
involved "secret information.1 22  The court also found that the
reporters potentially exceeded the scope of Food Lion's consent to
enter the property by their subsequent wrongful conduct, thereby
making them liable for trespass under North Carolina law.226 Finally,
another key distinguishing feature may have been the extent of the
deception Prime 7me Live used to gain entry to Food Lion. In order
to obtain employment at Food Lion, ABC reporters, with the help of a
union attempting to unionize the grocery store chain,227 gave false
identities, references, and work histories to Food Lion.228 One
producer even said in her application that she "love[d] meat
wrapping," and that she "would like to make a career with the
company.' 29 The reporters worked for Food Lion for about two
weeks, obtaining almost fifty hours of footage using hidden cameras
and microphones.23 ° Compared to Desnick, therefore, the behavior of
the reporters in the Food Lion case was both more deceptive and
perhaps ultimately more intrusive.231
223. Perhaps these same principles help resolve Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) and Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Media L.
Rptr. 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994). Both were undercover exposes of phony telepsychics.
Both occurred on business premises, and both were taped by pseudo employees who were
really working for Prime ime Live. The Sanders court held that the plaintiff had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace, even though the premises were not open
to the public. See Sanders, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
224. See Baker, supra note 153, at 29.
225. See Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (M.D.N.C.
1996).
226. See Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 887 F. Supp. 811, 820 (M.D.N.C.
1995).
227. See id. at 814. The United Food & Commercial Workers International Union had
been attempting to organize Food Lion employees for more than 10 years. See id.
228. See id. at 813-16.
229. Amy Singer, Food, Lies & ideotape, 19 AM. LAW., Apr. 1997, at 57, 59.
230. See FoodLion, 887 F. Supp. at 816.
231. Nonetheless, it is still difficult to know the exact scope of protection from liability
a reporter will receive if she chooses to go undercover. In fact, lawyers for Prime 71me Live
initially authorized the undercover investigation of Food Lion. See Baker, supra note 153, at
28.
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Looking at the cases, a media lawyer232 attempting to advise a
client whether or not to use surreptitious surveillance might conclude
the following: reporters can go undercover to gather news provided
they do not (1) invade the most private realms of a home or business,
(2) engage in a pattern of deception that is "too" elaborate, or (3) rely
on technology that picks up sights and sounds not available to the
ordinary senses. As the next section suggests, a fourth factor may also
be at work, although courts do not always make it explicit. Liability is
also less likely if the story being sought is of great public importance.
If any of these factors are weak, the lawyer's advice to his media
clients becomes more problematic.
C. The Economics oflntnusion
An argument can be made that the uncertain scope of protection
given to newsgathering achieves beneficial results because it forces
media defendants to weigh the intrusiveness of their behavior against
the importance of the story in deciding whether or not to employ
intrusive newsgathering methods. Yet if an appropriate balance is
struck, it happens only accidentally. Purely as a jurisprudential matter,
serendipity is a questionable basis for law's operation. As a practical
matter, the current uncertainty has negative consequences for both the
media and those whose privacy they invade.
1. Overdeterrence and Underdeterrence of Intrusive Newsgathering
The current uncertainty in the tort law governing newsgathering,
and particularly the law of intrusion, leads to both overdeterrence and
underdeterrence of intrusive newsgathering.
In situations where legal liability is uncertain, the question that
the lawyer and her media client must ask becomes an economic one.
The media's risk of being forced to pay a judgment (or even of being
sued) in any given case is miniscule. Nonetheless, litigation costs can
run to astronomical figures even if the media defendant ultimately
prevails,233 for as one commentator has noted, "the more complicated
the law, the more expensive the legal fees."234 If the media defendant
232. The media commonly rely on legal counsel to advise them as to whether a
proposed newsgathering technique is actionable.
233. See LUCAS A. PowE, JR., THE FouRTH ESTAT AND THM CoNsTIuToN 118-19
(1991) (repeating press arguments that the threat of large pretrial discovery costs have a
chilling effect on what information is published). There is some indication that privacy suits
have an even greater chilling effect on the media than libel suits. See BRUCE W. SANFORD,
LIBEL AND PRiVACY: THE PRE E NON AND DEFENSE OF LIIGATON 427 (1987).
234. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESs 250 (1986) [hereinafter SMOLLA, SuiNG].
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does not prevail, damages can run into the millions, an amount large
enough to make even the wealthiest media organization think twice
about employing questionable newsgathering methods."' Another
intangible factor that must be considered before approving
questionable newsgathering methods is that a lawsuit can interfere
with the ongoing business of gathering and publishing information. In
the end, the economic equation comes down to whether or not the
small risk of being held liable-coupled with the potential for
exorbitant litigation costs, a potentially huge judgment if the risk
materializes, and the attendant administrative burden of defending a
law suit-make pursuing the story with intrusive newsgathering
methods worthwhile.236
The answer depends partially on the importance of the story. If
the story is of great public importance, a media organization is likely
to be safe from legal liability in pursuing it. Consider 20/20's riveting
expos6 of abuses in nursing homes in Texas. 37 The images of elderly
residents with sores on their bodies, lying in filth, and tied to their beds
left an indelible impression on viewers, and the public outrage
generated by the story prompted immediate reforms by the Texas
legislature. Given the great public importance of the 20/20 story, it
seems unlikely that any plaintiff would bring suit, or, even if one did,
that any court would find 20/20 liable after performing such a great
public service.
There are, of course, other less laudable factors that shape the
economic equation of whether to use questionable newsgathering
techniques. One reason that 20/20 could afford to take the risk of
using hidden cameras is that dramatic exposes lead to high ratings and,
consequently, high profits. An expos6 on nursing homes may be
highly profitable, but so may an expos6 on fraudulent telepsychics. If
235. See id.
236. Thus, perhaps Professor Kalven was right in speculating that "[t]he right of
privacy is preeminently an instance where the law in action may change the significance of
the law in the books." Kalven, supra note 159, at 339.
237. See 20/20: Victims of Greed (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1991). In this
instance, going undercover was necessary to spur public outrage and prompt reform. In an
award winning series of newspaper articles, reporter Nancy Stancill first exposed the
shocking treatment of patients in Texas nursing homes. See Nancy Stancill, Deadly Neglect:
Texas and Its Nursing Homes (pts. 1-5), Hous. CHRoN., July 22-26, 1990, at Al. However,
reforms did not ensue until a three-month undercover investigation by 20/20 produced
graphic footage of residents tied to their beds, starving and lying in filth. See Ann Hodges,
Texas Nursing Home Woes Focus of20/20, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 24, 1991, at 3.
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the ratings are high enough, invading privacy is worth the risk,
regardless of the public significance of the story obtained.238
Another key factor in the decision whether to use questionable
newsgathering techniques is the economic strength of the media
organization involved. For a rich network like ABC, which makes
tremendous profits from its news magazine shows, a 5.5 million dollar
verdict like the one in Food Lion (reduced to $315,000 on appeal)2 39 is
a setback. But it does not jeopardize the network's long-term financial
health.
Consider, though, the plight of a local television station. While
the local station might be able to uncover serious abuses by going
undercover, even a small threat of liability may be enough to deter it
from doing so. Although the extent of this chilling effect is hard to
assess, the Supreme Court has long noted that the threat of large
damage awards causes individuals to "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone" than is strictly necessary to avoid legal liability.24° After all,
paying the legal fees alone to defend a tort action could jeopardize the
financial existence of a small station. Small newspapers and
magazines have little extra money to pay legal fees, much less huge
judgments.24' Thus, the message the media receives from a verdict
like the one in Food Lion is that surreptitious surveillance and other
nontraditional types of newsgathering are simply not worth the risk.
2. Creating False Hopes
The law's equivocal protection of newsgathering is not only
detrimental to the media, it is also harmful to the public interest. To
the extent that current law deters the media from pursuing stories of
great public importance, the public's First Amendment "right to
238. The law's failure to adequately deter unduly intrusive yet highly profitable
newsgathering also has negative secondary effects. The media's economic incentive is to
constantly push the edge of the envelope to obtain a larger portion of the reading or viewing
audience. Intrusions become just another weapon in the war for ratings. Yet the more the
media invades privacy, the more the public comes to view these invasions as ordinary and
therefore acceptable. The more ordinary intrusive techniques become, the harder it becomes
for courts and juries to decide that such techniques are highly offensive to the reasonable
person. Thus, the law's failure to deter intrusive newsgathering has a corrosive effect on
even the limited right to privacy that the law is designed to protect.
239. See Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
240. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,526 (1958).
241. The chilling effect is compounded in intrusion cases by the fact that courts have
never settled on the proper measure of damages. Some courts have held that a plaintiff can
recover damages for both the underlying intrusion and the subsequent publication, and others
limit damages to those stemming from the intrusion only. See King & Muto, supra note 157,
at 937 (citing cases).
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know" and even its health and safety may be jeopardized.242 To the
extent that current law fails to deter the most extreme types of
intrusive newsgathering, the right to privacy suffers.
There is a second sense in which the uncertainty in current law is
detrimental to plaintiffs. Because the law is so uncertain, plaintiffs
may choose to sue for media intrusions when they have no realistic
chance of prevailing. Plaintiffs in media cases are typically
represented by lawyers working on contingency fees. Unlike the
lawyers who tend to represent the media, plaintiffs' lawyers may not
be "repeat players" in media litigation and thus may be unduly lured
by the prospect of a huge judgment without realizing the remote
chances of recovering such a verdict.243 If plaintiffs' lawyers really
studied the statistics on plaintiffs' success rates, they might reasonably
decide that the chances of prevailing are too remote to justify suing the
media, particularly because the media's lawyers are prepared to
vigorously defend against liability to ensure that negative precedents
are not established.
Perhaps plaintiffs and their lawyers do understand this
phenomenon. After all, the number of suits brought against the press
have hardly kept pace with the increasing use of intrusive
newsgathering methods.2" One explanation for this phenomenon
might be that plaintiffs have made a realistic calculation of the odds
and decided that chances of winning are too small to justify suing.
Another explanation is that much of the general public believes
(erroneously, at least as a matter of legal theory) that the media are
always insulated from liability by the First Amendment.245 Even if the
plaintiffs are celebrities who are capable of hiring the finest attorneys
and paying to pursue largely symbolic goals, these plaintiffs may feel
242. See LeBel, Getting the News, supra note 17, at 1153. As Professor LeBel has
pointed out, "acquisition of information is often an expensive enterprise." Id. It is also a
time-consuming one. Although the media's First Amendment interest in gathering news
flows from their role as surrogates of the general public, it still may be justifiable to give the
media additional protection because the media have both the resources and incentives to
invest in the acquisition of socially beneficial information about public and private
wrongdoing. See id. The media therefore play a watchdog role over and above that
performed by govemment officials. See id. at 1154 ("Media activity, particularly in the form
of investigative joumalism, can be a valuable supplement to official conduct.").
243. On the other hand, plaintiffs' lawyers, who are used to taking huge risks for huge
payoffs, may rationally decide that the prospect of a multimillion dollar verdict is worth a
gamble.
244. See Gavison, supra note 197, at 457 (suggesting factors that might explain the
"relative rarity of legal actions" for invasion of privacy).
245. See generally SMOLLA, SuING, supra note 234.
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that it is not worth antagonizing the press, upon whom, to a large
extent, their celebrity status depends.246
Despite the many flaws in the intrusion tort, it still holds out
promise as a remedy because it is specifically designed to protect
privacy, and it is broad enough to adapt to the constantly changing
array of situations that arise in this area. Moreover, as a tort, intrusion
is suited to achieving the delicate balance between the public interest
in certain information and the interest in preserving individual privacy.
Before proposing reforms to the tort, it is important to understand the
difficulties the law faces in accommodating privacy and
newsgathering.
V. PRIVACY IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
A. Is the Intrusion Tort an Anachronism?
If the law is to provide a more effective remedy for the problem
of intrusive newsgathering, it must give the media and their lawyers
more concrete guidance as to what newsgathering behaviors are
proscribed. Simultaneously, the law must remain flexible enough to
encompass the wide variety of intrusive newsgathering techniques. It
must be nuanced enough to make fine and highly contextual
distinctions between legitimate and tortious newsgathering.
Obviously, this is no mean feat. But an even greater obstacle plagues
efforts to reform the tort law safeguarding privacy from media
intrusions.
Until this point, this Article has proceeded as if increased
protection of privacy from media intrusions needed no philosophical
justification. Privacy, after all, is a cherished value in American life.
Polls suggest that Americans are concerned about encroachments into
their private lives,247 and numerous legal commentators have offered
paeans to privacy's virtues and justifications for its legal protection.
Yet as Professor David Anderson has pointed out, not only do
Americans cherish privacy, they "also cherish information, candor and
freedom of speech.'2 4  When the two values conflict, it is not clear
that privacy should prevail.
This problem is particularly acute because the privacy protected
by the intrusion tort is explicitly defined by reference to community
246. See id.
247. SMrrH & LicHTYER, supra note 39, at 118-19 ("A full 80% of the general public
think that the news media often invade people's privacy, while less than one in five (17%)
think that the media generally respect people's privacy.").
248. ANDERSON, USING PEOPLE, supra note 126, at 13.
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norms. The realm of solitude protected by the intrusion tort is not
merely a zone of spatial or physical access. 249  Instead, as Professor
Robert Post has convincingly demonstrated, the realm of privacy
protected by the intrusion tort "cannot be reduced to objective facts
like spatial distance or information or observability; it can only be
understood by reference to norms of behavior.'250
The boundaries of this realm are transgressed only when a
defendant's behavior would be highly offensive to the reasonable
person, so the responsibility of deciding whether the defendant has
complied with community standards of social deportment falls upon
the jury.2 11 The reasonable person standard is nothing more than an
artificial construct;. 2 it is a figment of the legal imagination. This
standard nonetheless serves the important function of allowing juries
to define certain conduct as "socially unreasonable"2 3 in a complex
249. See Gavison, supra note 197, at 433 & n.40 (defining solitude as protecting
physical access). Gavison searches for a "neutral and descriptive" concept of privacy. See id.
at 424. This neutral and descriptive concept is valuable in helping to understand why the law
should protect privacy, but ultimately the law must make a value judgment as to how much
privacy should be protected, a point Gavison seems to concede. See id. "Wn the context of
legal protection, privacy should also indicate a value." Id.
250. Post, Social Foundations, supra note 129, at 969.
251. This is not to say that there are no other definitions of privacy. Indeed, much ink
has been spilled in trying to define this rather amorphous concept or in rejecting the
possibility of achieving a workable definition. See, e.g., ALAN WEsrN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others"); Gavison, supra note 197, at 423 (describing privacy as consisting
of three related principles-anonymity, seclusion, and autonomy); Richard Posner, The Right
to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978) (analyzing privacy from an economic perspective);
Judith J. Thompson, The Right to Privacy, in RIGHTS, REsTTON AND RISK, 117 (1986)
(observing that "nobody seems to have any clear idea" about what constitutes the right to
privacy); Zimmerman, supra note 126, at 364-65 (arguing that the private facts tort is not an
effective remedy for invasions of privacy, and that perhaps the problem defies legal solution).
Nonetheless, Post's sociological account of privacy best describes the nature of the right
protected by the intrusion tort. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 129, at 959-6 8.
252. Indeed, a classic exercise set by torts professors for their students is to identify
the characteristics of the so-called reasonable person. Professors themselves also indulge in
this exercise. See Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951); cf. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory
and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 21 (1988) (arguing that the "reasonable man" concept, even if
denoted the "reasonable person" concept, implicitly reflects male norms).
253. See KEETON, supra note 132, at 6. Tort law uses the reasonable person standard
in many different contexts. The law of battery, for example, is defined as intentional contact
that would be harmful or offensive to a reasonable person. Rarely does one hear calls for the
abolition of battery on the ground that bodily integrity is too amorphous a concept to merit
protection or that the reasonable person standard is simply too vague to serve as a predicate
for legal liability. For definitions of battery and the interests it protects, see Ghassemieh v.
Schafer, 447 A.2d 84, 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093
(Wash. 1955); RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 19. Likewise, few commentators today
question the desirability of providing redress for emotional distress, even though the interest
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and constantly changing society.2 4 The standard is overtly normative.
By determining whether the defendant's behavior was offensive to a
reasonable person, the jury defines the realm of solitude that the
plaintiff had a right to expect, 55 and in so doing establishes the rules of
conduct or "civility rules" by which we constitute ourselves as a
community.
6
Because the intrusion tort is designed to enforce the community's
existing civility rules, the tort is highly adaptable to changes in those
rules. The adaptability of the tort, however, creates practical problems
in enforcing the rights it creates.
First, social norms are notoriously difficult to identify.
2 57
Although polls indicate that society values privacy, polls neither
indicate the weight privacy should be given in any particular factual
scenario, nor what interests the concept encompasses. This inherent
difficulty gives the realm of privacy protected by intrusion a somewhat
amorphous quality, and this quality partially explains the law's failure
to adequately protect the right.58 When faced with a concept as vague
as privacy, courts understandably err on the side of the more familiar
need for press freedom. This obstacle should not, however, cause the
legal community to despair of providing meaningful privacy
protected is inherently difficult to define. Instead, the debate tends to center on how to
protect against emotional distress and what kinds of emotional distress are worthy of
protection rather than on whether the tort should exist at all.
254. As Leon Green has argued, this flexibility is precisely the beauty of the concept
(although Green was discussing the use of the reasonable person standard in negligence law
rather than in the law of privacy). See Leon Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 YALE L.J. 1029,
1039 (1928); see also Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths," 34
WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 584-85 (1993) (noting that tort law's flexibility is reflected "in
the development of new causes of action... to accommodate majoritarian notions of right
and wrong ... in the open-endedness of the elements that comprise a number of tort causes
of action ... and in the recoverability of substantial damages for intangible affronts to
dignity").
255. This feature of the intrusion tort has two practical consequences. First, the
unduly sensitive plaintiff will not recover even if she has suffered genuine emotional injury
due to defendant's behavior. Second, the plaintiff need not prove any actual injury once it is
established that the social norms of the community have been transgressed. See Post, Social
Foundations, supra note 129, at 964.
256. See id.at963.
257. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of Community,
71 WASH. L. REv. 1, 20 (1996).
258. Judge Skelly Wright describes the law's failure to "articulate a well defined, fully
developed body of law" as understandable in light of the "amorphous quality of the right to
privacy." Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National
Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEx. L. REv. 630, 631 (1968); see Don R. Pember &
Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. Rav. 57,57
(1974) (noting that "[t]o say that the law of privacy is not a great hallmark of logic and clarity
in American law is to indulge in egregious understatement').
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protection, as some commentators have suggested.5 9 The concept of
negligence (or breach) in tort law hinges on whether the defendant
behaved as a reasonable person under the circumstances and could
also be characterized as somewhat vague and amorphous. Yet it is
precisely this feature of negligence law that makes it a workable
standard, for as Leon Green has argued, the "number of instances of
conduct which could be labelled either as negligent or non-negligent is
beyond the limits of any catalog the law can make.""26 Rather than
seeking to fashion a precise definition of privacy law, perhaps privacy
law, like negligence law, should be content to accept a rough formula
that permits juries to reach an accommodation between competing
values.
A second, more fundamental problem with how intrusion defines
privacy is that social norms are fluid and that they change over time.61
From a cursory look at American popular culture, one might conclude
that Americans do not expect or even desire protection from media
intrusions. 62  The media invade privacy because it sells, and
Americans have an apparently voracious appetite for stories obtained
by intrusive means. The paparazzi photographers who hounded
Princess Diana received rich rewards for their efforts, selling their
photos for as much as $500,000.211 The publications that bought the
photos were making a wise investment, for these expenditures were
almost certain to be recouped in increased sales at the newsstand.
Even the coverage of her death, which was extraordinarily extensive,
reflected the enormous public interest in the most minute details of her
life.
259. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 159, at 327 (arguing that the privacy torts are of
minimal use except for commercial misappropriation).
260. Green, supra note 254, at 1029-30.
261. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Note, Autonomy, Community, and Traditions of
Liberty: The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 6 DuKE L.J. 1398, 1401 (1990)
("[B]ecause privacy concerns are, in large part, defined in relation to a particular society at a
particular point in time, the concept itself if likely to evolve.").
262. If society does not actually value privacy, but merely pays lip service to it, legal
remedies are likely to be ineffective. As Thomas Cooley wrote:
Any standard by which the law can undertake to compel the people to regulate
their conduct must be one generally and spontaneously accepted, so that their
approving judgment shall accompany the endeavor to enforce conformity. It must
not be one that a majority of the people do not habitually observe, because if the
majority of the people are law breakers, it is obvious that only some extraneous
power could ever enforce the law.
I THoMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACr § 3, at 5 (4th ed. 1932).
263. See Di New Boyfriend (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 12, 1997).
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The appetite for stories obtained by intrusive means seems
almost boundless. Undercover investigations of the sort condemned in
Food Lion commonly run during sweeps week, because the media
know that such investigations gamer large audiences. "Reality
television shows" capitalize on showing people in moments of crisis,
thereby affording audiences a titillating form of emotional voyeurism.
Even stolen information can find a market as long as it is sufficiently
provocative. The thief who stole a videotape of rock guitarist Tommy
Lee having sex with his wife, Pamela Anderson Lee, accurately
predicted that the tape would sell.2" In fact, Penthouse magazine, also
predicting that the public's response to the tape would make the
investment worthwhile, purchased the tape.265
If the market has buyers of private information, it also has a
number of willing sellers. Daytime television is filled with individuals
who trot out intimate details of their lives for public consumption.
There is no apparent shortage of volunteers for MTV's "The Real
World," which films a group of roommates throughout every hour of
their daily lives together. The Internet is likewise filled with people
willing to reveal the most intimate and disgusting details about
themselves.
But the American appetite for private information does not
necessarily indicate that Americans accord privacy little or no value.
The very same individual who enjoys watching an undercover expose
of a phony telepsychic or the latest pick-up lines in a local bar would
probably be outraged if Prime Time Live crews came to his workplace
and surreptitiously filmed his every move. Few individuals apply
264. See Liz Braun, And Another Thing, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 2, 1996, at 39 (reporting
the Lee claim that a construction worker stole the tape from their home and then sold the tape
to Penthouse). Penthouse published pictures from the tape in June 1996. See Pamela
Anderson and Tommy Lee v. Penthouse Decision Opens Door on Private Lives, BUs. WIRF,
Apr. 4, 1997. The Lees sued for invasion of privacy and misappropriation. See id. The court
dismissed the invasion of privacy claim because the Lees previously openly discussed their
sex lives, opening this part of their lives to public scrutiny. See id. The court dismissed the
misappropriation claim because the pictures were used in connection with a newsworthy
story. See id.
265. The tape was very profitable. The pictures from the tape appeared in Penthouse
and the Internet Entertainment Group (lEG) posted the tape on the internet See Romesh
Ratnesar, The Honeymooners, TIME, Jan. 12, 1998, at 74. The Lees sought an injunction
against IEG, but a California Superior Court judge denied the injunction. See id. The couple
then settled with lEG, although there is apparently a disagreement about the terms of the
settlement. See Pamela Anderson, CiTy News SERV., Mar. 20, 1998 (reporting that
Anderson's attorney claims that the terms of the settlement are so vague that they will
probably have to go to court to determine what the settlement means). IEG charges $14.95 to
watch the tape on the internet See id. IEG has also released a version of the tape on video,
which is being sold nationwide and has become the best-selling adult video of all time. See
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Kantian analysis to privacy; we value privacy for ourselves but are still
willing to invade, if only vicariously, the privacy of others. Thus, the
paradox of privacy-that Americans pay lip service to privacy in polls
while simultaneously consuming the privacy of others-might not
really be a paradox, but merely a common facet of human nature.
Moreover, those who argue that we no longer value privacy
might want to look at the historical evidence.266 In the sixteenth
century, people expected little sexual privacy. Poor families often slept
in one room, if not one bed. Kings were accustomed to having others
in their bedchambers; indeed, to be appointed to serve the king in his
bedchamber was a great honor for nobles of his realm. Today, in
contrast, no parent would dream of having sex in front of children, and
houses are designed to separate parents' bedrooms from those of their
children.267
Does this evidence suggest that Americans today value privacy
more than their ancestors did? Hardly, when one considers that
newspapers today are filled with information (such as the President's
sexual assignations) that would have been unthinkable to publish just
fifty years ago. Rather, it might be more accurate to conclude that
while the nature of privacy has changed, the importance of privacy has
not.
B. The Social Value ofPrivacy
Even a media-saturated society should value the intrusion tort
because it protects individuals from having to live every moment of
their lives in the blinding glare of public scrutiny. Privacy enables the"
individual to preserve a sphere in which to develop her ideas and
goals,2 68 to let her guard down,269 and to develop relationships of trust
266. Or the cultural evidence. See Alan Westin, The Origins of Modern Claims to
Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 56, 67 (Ferdinand
David Schoeman ed., 1984) ("[One] element of privacy that seems universal is a tendency on
the part of individuals to invade the privacy of others, and of society to engage in surveillance
to guard against anti-social conduct."). Human beings have always had an appetite for
private information, particularly when it concerns those in positions of power and authority,
for possessing private information about another person is one way of obtaining power over
them. See id. at 67-68. "People want to know what others are doing, especially the great and
the powerful, partly as a means of gauging their own performances and desires and partly as
a means of vicarious experience." Id.; see SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF
MIsTRUST IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 2 (1991). "[S]candal persists because it is, across eras and
nations, utterly irresistible. When we see the public masks slip, we become like those
laboratory rats who, when taught to trip a switch stimulating pleasure centers in their brains,
keep doing it over and over, to the exclusion of food and sleep." Id.
267. See ANDERSON, USING PEOPLE, supra note 126.
268. See Bloustein, supra note 159, at 974 (arguing that privacy allows the individual
to develop his individuality and that "the gist of the wrong in the intrusion cases is not the
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and intimacy.2 70 George Orwell graphically depicted the horrors of life
lived perpetually in the spotlight: 'There was of course no way of
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment....
You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in
darkness, every movement scrutinized. ' 2 71
For most people, Orwell's scenario remains rather remote. We
tend to believe that only celebrities like Princess Diana are subject to
being dogged at every turn by the media, and in general we have little
empathy for their plight. Celebrities, after all, thrive on publicity, and
although they sacrifice a certain amount of privacy in return, they are
also able to buy a zone of privacy that is unavailable to the average
citizen. How many average citizens have the luxury of owning several
houses, flying on a private jet, or vacationing on a private island?
Yet several recent examples indicate that the average citizen's
privacy is protected from media intrusions primarily by media
disinterest,272 a tenuous basis at best for privacy protection. Almost
any private person can be plunged into the spotlight through forces
outside her control. Monica Lewinsky, the White House intern who
had an affair with President Clinton, no longer has the freedom to
leave her home without undergoing an almost physical assault by
reporters. People she considered friends are eager to grant interviews
to the media to help journalists dissect every facet of her personality.
In helping people involved in the Atlanta Olympics bombing, security
guard Richard Jewell undoubtedly never dreamed that he would soon
have reporters camped on his lawn and probing every facet of his
personal life.273 Consider also the telepsychics "unmasked" by the
undercover investigation of Prime Time Live.274 These individuals did
not realize until too late that every moment of their work lives were
intentional infliction of mental distress but rather a blow to human dignity, an assault on
human personality"); Gavison, supra note 197, at 446-47 ("[Privacy] is essential for all
human activities that require concentration, such as learning, writing, and all forms of
creativity.").
269. See Gavison, supra note 197, at 447.
270. I do not claim to develop a comprehensive theory of how invasions of privacy
harm the individual, for this task has been performed admirably by others. See, e.g.,
Bloustein, supra note 159, at 972-93; Gavison, supra note 197, at 446; Post, Social
Foundations, supra note 129, at 959-68; Westin, supra note 266, at 56-71.
271. GEORGE ORWELL, NINErEEN EIGHTY-FouR 2 (Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd.
1984) (1949).
272. See Gavison, supra note 197, at 469.
273. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
274. See Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. 2321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
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being secretly 'recorded, to be ultimately broadcast on national
television.275  Instead, they incorrectly assumed that they were
protected at least by media disinterest. They were wrong, with
276dramatic consequences.
These scenarios are disturbing because individuals subjected to
intrusive surveillance seem to suffer an almost palpable dignitary
harm. But if that were the only basis for protecting privacy, the law
might justifiably conclude that individual harm must go without
recompense to satisfy the broader societal interest in the gathering and
dissemination of information. Yet accommodating privacy and press
freedoms is not simply a matter of weighing individual harm against
societal benefit. Liberal society is committed to preserving individual
freedom, and one of its ideals is to treat each of its citizens with respect
and concern. Society in turn benefits when its members are free to
pursue their own goals and dreams without undue interference from
government or from other citizens.277
Paradofically, protecting privacy may also promote democratic
self-govemance, one of the core values safeguarded by the First
Amendment.2 7' Freedom of speech and freedom of the press foster
democratic. self-governance by encouraging lively and enlightened
debate on public issues. Protecting individual privacy from undue
intrusions may also foster a richer and more meaningful public
dialogue. Protecting privacy allows the individual to establish
boundaries between himself and his community, and, in doing so,
allows him to establish his individuality.279 It is his individuality, in
turn, that enables him to offer unique and meaningful contributions to
the public dialogue.
Protecting privacy further fosters public debate because to the
extent society denies citizens protection from media intrusions,
275. See Sanders, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 596; Kersis, 22 Media L. Rep. at 2322.
276. Allegedly as a result of the Prime nIme Live exposure, one of the Kersis workers
committed suicide. See Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 25 Media L. Rep. 1701, 1702 (9th
Cir. 1997).
277. See Gavison, supra note 197, at 455. "We desire a society in which individuals
can grow, maintain their mental health and autonomy, create and maintain human relations,
and lead meaningful lives." Id.
278. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CF.
REv. 245, 251 (arguing that the First Amendment allows voters to acquire the "intelligence,
integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion" that is necessary for self-governance).
279. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 129, at 973 ("An individual's ability to
press or to waive territorial claims, his ability to choose respect or intimacy, is deeply
empowering for his sense of himself as an independent or autonomous person."); Jeffrey
Reinan, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY,
supra note'266, at 310 ("Privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual's moral
title to his existence is conferred.").
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citizens may decide to forego participation in public debate in hopes of
preserving a sphere of privacy by virtue of media disinterest if not by
legal sanction.280 Even those citizens who are dragged into public
debate by virtue of media intrusions become forced participants in the
debate-not as subjects but as objects. These victims may find
themselves effectively silenced and unable to make meaningful
contributions because the terms of the debate have already been
framed by others. 281
C. Newsgathering as a Public Good
If privacy is a public good, so too is newsgathering.282 In order to
strike a proper balance between the two, however, it is important to
understand the precise nature of society's interest in newsgathering.
The Supreme Court has refused with good cause to carve out an
extensive constitutional privilege to gather news.283 The first objection
to creating such a privilege is largely administrative but nonetheless
formidable. If the Court were to create a constitutional privilege to
gather news, the Court would have to resolve an issue it has
traditionally evaded: who is the press?28 4 The Court would be forced
280. See Anderson, Libel Law, supra note 123, at 531 (arguing that the actual malice
rule "deters participation in public life [because] [n]o rational person can fail to take into
account the reputational consequences of this rule when deciding whether to run for public
office").
281. This point should not be overemphasized. After all, the premise of the "public
figure" doctrine in defamation law is that even involuntary public figures have access to
channels of communication to combat defamatory statements.
282. There is a necessary tension between these two public goods because the media
"are, in a literal sense, in the 'anti-privacy' business." McQuail, supra note 19, at 181. Thus
the question is not whether the media will be allowed to invade privacy but how much.
283. As a constitutional matter, the Court could choose to balance the state's interest in
imposing tort liability for intrusion against a First Amendment right to gather news. See
LeBel, Getting the News, supra note 17, at 1145 (arguing that "newsgathering is a realm of
journalistic activity that calls out for constitutional scrutiny-and, if appropriate,
constitutional protection-just as much as does news publication"). Indeed, the Court has
taken a similar approach with defamation and with imposing liability for publication of
private facts. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (plaintiff may not
recover under state tort law where defendant publishes truthful information lawfully obtained
about a matter of public significance, unless plaintiff is able to show that the state's remedy is
necessary to achieve a state interest of the highest order); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (creating a constitutional privilege for statements that defame public
officials, at least when such statements are made without "actual malice"). See generally
Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of Constitutionalizing
State Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 173 (arguing that constitutional scrutiny of
state tort law leads to complexity and confusion).
284. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703:05 (1972) (rejecting a constitutional
privilege for reporters to refuse to answer grand jury subpoenas, in part because if the
privilege were granted, "it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who
qualified for the privilege").
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to decide whether to continue to accord the "lonely pamphleteer" as
much First Amendment protection as the institutional press (for
example, the New York imes or the Washington Post).285  The
emergence of new technologies further complicates the problem of
choosing between an institutional definition of the press and a
functional definition. These new technologies make each citizen
capable of becoming the "lonely pamphleteer" that the First
Amendment is designed to protect.286 If the Court did limit the
privilege to the institutional press, the Court would be forced to
detennine whether the privilege extended only to reputable news
media organizations or to tabloids and other entertainment media.
This inquiry obviously poses thorny issues for the Court.
Even if these administrative obstacles could be overcome,
extending a constitutional privilege to gather news would largely
immunize the media from the reach of state tort law. Such
immunization would establish the media as a quasi-governmental
watchdog with powers equal to or perhaps even superior to those of
the police. This prospect is disturbing because it would give the media
a source of largely unchecked investigative power. Federal and state
constitutions place limits on the investigative powers of the police,
circumscribing, for example, their ability to invade private homes.
The police are also subject to control by elected officials, and may act
only under the auspices of substantive law passed by legislatures. The
media, on the other hand, would not be subject to these restraints, and
this may explain the Supreme Court's reluctance to accord the media
newsgathering privileges over and above those of the ordinary citizen.
Newsgathering does merit some degree of legal accommodation
due to its intimate connection to news dissemination. Although the
media do not merit the same investigative powers as the police, even
nontraditional reporting methods deserve some measure of legal
protection due to the special role of the media in modem society. The
media are uniquely positioned to safeguard public welfare by exposing
crime, corruption and fraud, and the media have both the institutional
incentives and resources necessary to gather this information.287
285. See id. at 704 (noting the traditional doctrine that the "lonely pamphleteer" has as
much right to freedom of the press as a large metropolitan newspaper).
286. Finally, the creation of a constitutional right to gather news would potentially
require the government to take affirmative steps to make certain types of information
available to the public. Although much information must be made available now under the
Freedom of Information Act and other types of public records laws, the increased
administrative burden of creating a constitutional right to certain types of information would
be tremendous.
287. See LeBel, Getting the News, supra note 17, at 1153.
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Media investigations that expose wrongdoers in the private sector are
"a valuable supplement to official conduct" because the government
has neither the time nor the resources to investigate all private
wrongdoing.288 Media investigations of the public sector help citizens
monitor the performance of the official branches of government.289
Indeed, it is this watchdog function that underlies the description of the
press as the Fourth Estate9 ° of government.
Newsgathering is an important right, but it is not an absolute one.
Although newsgathering helps produce valuable public information,
recognition of an extensive right to gather news would seriously
threaten the autonomy and freedom of the targets of such
investigations. The challenge for tort law, and particularly for the tort
of intrusion, is to assess accurately the consequences of tipping the
balance between privacy and newsgathering in one direction or the
other.
D. Newsgathering and Nuances of Context
Even if tort law were to acquire a richer philosophical
understanding of both the privacy right protected by the intrusion tort
and the right to gather news, strildng an appropriate balance between
them would still present practical difficulties. The distinctions
between tortious and nontortious newsgathering will continue to hinge
on fine nuances of context, and the law will still have difficulty in
specifying the distinguishing characteristics of intrusive
newsgathering.
Consider, for example, the difficulty the law faces in determining
whether or not undercover investigations are unwarranted intrusions.
Undercover reporting has an illustrious history in helping to promote
social reform. In the modem era, undercover reporting has exposed
abuse and neglect of the elderly,29' children,292 and the mentally ill.293
288. Id. at 1154. To a certain extent, the distinction between the private sector and the
public sector is an artificial one. In 1967, the Supreme Court took note of the increasing
interaction between government and private industry and the "rapid fusion of economic and
political power, [the] merging of science, industry, and government, and [the] high degree of
interaction between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds." Curtis Publ'g Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
289. See Nick D. Williams, America's Third Force: The Watchdog Press, in THE
RvspoNsmIrIyoFYOTHEPRBss 169, 170-71 (Gerald Gross ed., 1966).
290. See, e.g., PowE, supra note 233.
291. See 20/20: Victims of Greed, supra note 237.
292. See Kathleen Kerr, Out of This World: In the City's Shadow, the Most Fragile of
Kids are Prey to Assaults in a State Hospital, NEwSDAY, Dec. 6, 1992, at 7 (after trying to
gain entry by ordinary means, the reporter resorted to going undercover).
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Undercover reporting has also revealed the conditions of slave labor
camps294 and sweatshops,29 and has unmasked corrupt government
officials. 96 This exposure often generates the widespread public
outrage necessary to spur rapid reform.
In these cases, the intrusiveness of the means used to gather the
story seems justified by the public interest served. Yet these same
investigative tools lend themselves to less worthy ends, and what is
justifiable in one context may be unjustifiable in another. Compare the
20/20 story on nursing home abuses297 to the Life expos6 of Mr.
Dietemann's medical quackery in Dietemann v. ime, Inc.298 The use
of hidden cameras by 20/20 was apparently essential to galvanize
public opinion and spur reform of life-threatening abuses. Indeed,
print journalist Nancy Stancill originally broke the story in an award-
winning series of articles in the Houston Chronicle,299 but reforms did
not ensue until 20/20 documented the abuses in a form the public
could not ignore."' In Dietemann, on the other hand, the Life reporters
provided titillating details about Dietemann's idiosyncrasies, including
a picture of him waving a "wand" over one of the reporters, to give
their story audience appeal. Given that M. Dietemann's quackery was
harming no one and that Life story on medical quackery could easily
have been obtaied through less intrusive means," 1 it is not at all clear
that the press's right to gather information outweighed Dietemann's
privacy interest, at least in this context.3 2
293. See Prime lime Live: Prisoners of Care (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 10,
1989).
294. See Sarah Henry, Harry War, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1996, (Magazine), at 12
(describing how Chinese dissident Harry Wu "disguise[ed] himself in a police uniform and
Mao-style suits" to shoot "undercover footage of forced-labor camps for '60 Minutes"' and
to gather information for a story that appeared in Newsweek).
295. See Dateline NBC: SweatingIt Out (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 20, 1996).
296. See Prime ime Live: Business as Usual (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 25,
1991) (reporting on congressmen who used loopholes to have taxpayers pay for vacation in
Barbados). For additional examples, see Patemo, supra note 3, at 40.
297. See 20/20: ictims of Greed, supra note 237.
298. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). See discussion infra note 81 and accompanying
text.
299. See Stancill, supra note 237.
300. 20/20 produced a three-month, undercover investigation containing graphic
footage of residents tied to their beds, starving and lying in filth. See Hodges, supra note
237, at 3.
301. For example, investigators could have looked to Mr. Dietemann's arrest record.
302. An even more pointed example of the use of hidden cameras for frivolous ends is
demonstrated by Sanders v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 25 Media L. Rptr. 1343 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997). In Sanders, a reporter for Prime 77me Live obtained ajob as a telepsychic, despite her
professed lack of qualifications. See id. Once on the job, she surreptitiously recorded and
filmed one of her co-workers in the performance of his duties to lend credibility to the Prime
lime Live expos6 of the telepsychic industry. See id. Sanders hardly represents the kind of
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The importance of context in separating legitimate and
illegitimate intrusions also helps explain why the Food Lion case is so
controversial. On one hand, the unsanitary conditions at Food Lion
were clearly a matter of public concern, for Food Lion's practices
jeopardized the health and safety of its customers. On the other, the
Food Lion story could have been obtained by less intrusive means.
Prime Tme Live's reporters did not merely enter Food Lion as any
other customers would. Instead, working in conjunction with a union
that was hostile to Food Lion, the reporters falsified their identities,
resumes and work histories and constructed an elaborate network of
lies to obtain more than fifty hours of hidden camera footage, some of
which was allegedly "staged" to make the story. 3 Under the
circumstances, it is not entirely surprising that the jury roundly
condemned Prime ime Live's newsgathering conduct.
In cases like Food Lion, privacy is violated primarily to boost
sales or ratings rather than to serve the public interest.3 4 The problem
is that the profit motive per se does not invalidate the use of intrusive
newsgathering techniques. Some intrusive methods may be essential
if the press is to serve its watchdog function and protect the public
from government corruption or from serious threats to public health
and safety.
Other newsgathering methods present different but equally
intractable problems. Some newsgathering methods are unduly
intrusive solely because of their location, regardless of the information
they uncover. What could justify the media in following paramedics
into a private home to film a dying man's agony3 5 or following police
hard hitting journalism that justifies such elaborate patterns of deception, yet Sanders was
unable to recover because the court found he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy. See id.
303. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 927 (M.D.N.C.
1997). A critical issue in the case is that Prime ime Live did not have to go undercover to
get the story. Prime lIme Live spoke to more than 20 witnesses who would have documented
Food Lion's unsanitary practices. See id. Some of these witnesses were former employees of
the grocery store chain, and thus would have been highly credible sources. See id. But
Prime ime Live is a television program, and, as such, its stories need visuals, the more
graphic the better. Visuals lend impact to the story, and certainly the footage obtained by
Prime ime Live was memorable. It is not clear how much weight the law should give Prime
ime Live's "need" for visuals; after all, Prime lime Live could have done an effective story
without them. Even so, the law should not discriminate unthinkingly against television
journalists, for as the 20/20 story indicates, television can sometimes be far more effective
than print in prompting beneficial reforms. It is precisely cases like Food Lion that test the
law's ability to make the fine distinctions necessary to protect privacy against the media's
voracious demands for information.
304. See Patemo, supra note 3, at 43.
305. See Miller v. National Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1469 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (holding liable a camera crew that followed paramedics into an apartment to film
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into a domestic abuse Victim's home to film her pain? 6 Although the
victims of these tragedies must, of necessity, admit police and
paramedics into their homes, the press is not entitled to intrude into the
most sacrosanct realms of privacy.
Still other newsgathering methods are problematic only when
taken to extremes. While celebrities are subject to more coverage than
private citizens, the media's relentless hounding of both Princess
Diana and Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis provided the public with little
in the way of vital information that could not have been obtained by
less intrusive methods. Likewise, media "stake-outs" of the homes of
newsworthy individuals, such as Monica Lewinsky and Richard
Jewell, rarely bring new information to light, but certainly imprison
their targets.3 7 Thus, the very same newsgathering methods that serve
the public interest in some cases may exact an exorbitantly high price
from individual privacy in others.
VI. REJUVENATING INTRUSION
The problem of intrusive newsgathering does not lend itself to
easy solutions. Even if society reaches the consensus that privacy is
worth protecting, providing a remedy that will cure the uncertainty of
current law without unduly sacrificing sensitivity to context is no
simple matter.
A. Striking an Appropriate Balance
The need for certainty in this area of law makes a rights-based
solution initially attractive. Simple trespass is relatively effective at
deterring intrusive newsgathering on private property because it
requires no elaborate balancing of competing interests. Trespass
works well because it is backed by venerable historical tradition and
widespread societal consensus that a man's home is his castle. Once a
reporter enters private property without the owner's consent for any
reason, whether noble or ignoble, she is liable for trespass. Although a
rights-based approach to intrusion cases would provide needed
certainty, it is too blunt an instrument to be applied more broadly to the
problem of intrusive newsgathering.
attempts to revive a heart attack victim). But cf Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d
914, 918 (Fla. 1977) (creating a privilege implied from custom to follow police onto private
property).
306. See Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745,750-51 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
307. See supra note 41. For another "hounding" case, see Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F.
Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (issuing injunction against broadcast journalists).
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Most of the difficult cases in the newsgathering context occur in
public places. These cases do not lend themselves to a rights-based
approach because it is difficult to reach consensus about what privacy
rights the individual should have in a public setting. Thus, it is
impossible to define the protected sphere of privacy with the requisite
degree of specificity for a rights-based approach to be viable. A
rights-based approach is also unattractive because intrusive
newsgathering cases put two rights at stake instead of one. Both
privacy and newsgathering are important social values, and any
increase in one results in the diminishment of the other."8
Consequently, tort law must strike a precarious balance in dealing
with media intrusions. The model of balancing used in other privacy
torts case is not encouraging. The private facts tort, for example,
makes the publication of private facts privileged if the information is
newsworthy.3"9  As Professor Rodney Smolla and others have
convincingly demonstrated, this balancing method is far too simplistic
for rights as subtle and nuanced as the rights to privacy and free
speech. 10 This method ignores the possibility, for example, that
information could be both private and newsworthy simultaneously.
Moreover, balancing tests are often criticized because of their
unpredictability, and to the extent this criticism is true, it is not clear
that a balancing test would be any improvement over the vagaries of
existing law.
Ideally, any solution to the problem of intrusive newsgathering
would have the certainty of a rights-based approach and the flexibility
of a balancing approach. This ideal solution, in turn, would be subtle
enough to separate aggressive coverage from harassment and
hounding, legitimate surveillance from illegitimate intrusion, and
would delineate particular locations as simply off-limits to coverage at
all. Although the intrusion tort currently fails to achieve these goals,
intrusion is nonetheless tort law's best hope for a meaningful remedy
for media intrusions.
Unlike other torts that affect newsgathering, intrusion retains
great promise as a remedy because it is tailored to redress privacy
invasions, but is still ambitious enough to encompass the variety of
308. Consequential analysis of privacy interests is common in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which allows the government to invade individual privacy if it has a good
enough reason for doing so. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An
Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted By Society, " 42 DuKE L.J.
727(1993).
309. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652C.
310. See RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIEr'Y 38-42 (1929).
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media intrusions. Unlike recent legislative proposals aimed at curbing
intrusive newsgathering, intrusion is also limited enough to overcome
constitutional constraints. Even so, intrusion's usefulness in protecting
privacy against media intrusions has been undermined by crabbed
interpretations of its protections, and courts must remedy this deficit
before any further refinement of the tort can be undertaken.
As argued in Part IV, courts must first expand their understanding
of the intrusion tort by acknowledging that an individual has a right to
be free from invasion of privacy in public places, albeit a very narrow
one."' Galella v. Onassis" illustrates how a court can recognize this
principle without sacrificing the public's interest in acquiring
information about newsworthy events. Ron Galella was a paparazzi
photographer who dogged Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and her
children." 3 He bribed doormen and "romanced family servants" to
gain information about Mrs. Onassis' comings and goings; he jumped
and postured about to photograph her in public places.31 ' Moreover,
his extreme antics endangered the safety of Mrs. Onassis and her
children."' Rather than concluding that Mrs. Onassis had no right of
privacy in public places, the Galella court looked at the practical effect
of the defendant's conduct. The defendant managed, through his
intrusive conduct, to "'insinuate[] himself into the very fabric of Mrs.
Onassis' life.""'3 6 Thus, while the court recognized the public interest
in coverage of Mrs. Onassis, the court found that Galella had exceeded
"the reasonable bounds of newsgatheing,"3 7 particularly when his
"constant surveillance, his obtrusive and intruding presence" was
weighed against "the de minimis public importance of the daily
activities of... [Mrs. Onassis]."31 8 The court recognized that even in a
public setting intrusive newsgathering can be so extreme as to deprive
a plaintiff of any semblance of privacy (or even of freedom of
movement).
311. Professor Andrew McClurg has made an extended version of this argument in his
article, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in
Public Places, supra note 25, at 995. Indeed, the main thrust of his article is that "there is
such a thing as 'public privacy' that tort law should recognize and protect." Id. I agree with
Professor McClurg, but believe that this reform would be only a preliminary step toward
providing meaningful protection from media intrusions.
312. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
313. See id. at992.
314. Seeid.
315. Seeid.
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The second step toward reform of the intrusion tort is for courts
to recognize that filming, taping, or recording a target is potentially
more intrusive than mere observation. As Professor McClurg has
argued, photographing someone's activities is more intrusive than
simple observation because once a permanent record is created, the
subject is at the mercy of the person who holds the photograph.319
Additionally, photographing is more intrusive than merely observing
because it creates the potential that the subject's image can be
transmitted at any time to an unlimited audience, thereby increasing
the intrusiveness of the defendant's initial behavior.320 Photographing
may also be more intrusive because it creates the potential that the
subject's actions will be exposed to a completely different audience
than the one she intended or expected. Individuals typically tailor their
behavior to the expected audience, and by denying individuals this
opportunity, the defendant violates both their expectations of
anonymity and their autonomy in selecting to whom they will reveal
parts of themselves.32'
This is not to say that all filming, recording, or photographing in
public places is inherently intrusive. Again, courts must be sensitive to
context, for there are relative degrees of privacy even in public places,
and certain types of surveillance are more intrusive than others. Thus,
courts must consider factors such as (1) whether or not the defendant's
use of technology (for example, a shotgun mike) enhanced his normal
sensory capacities, (2) whether or not the plaintiff was aware she was
being observed or filmed, (3) whether or not the plaintiff was acting in
a private capacity or professional capacity, and (4) the exact location of
the alleged intrusion.322 Recognition that technology may transform
319. See McClurg, supra note 25, at 1042.
320. See id. My argument is slightly different than Professor McClurg's. Professor
McClurg seems to assume that the subsequent transmission is what makes filming intrusive.
I argue instead that the potential for subsequent transmission makes the initial filming
intrusive. The distinction is semantic but important. If the invasion of privacy only occurs
upon transmission of the plaintiff's image, then the appropriate tort remedy is the private
facts tort rather than intrusion. For further discussion of this distinction, see infra Part III.B.2.
321. Paradoxically, an individual is capable of feeling (and actually being) completely
anonymous when surrounded by strangers. An individual may therefore act differently in
front of strangers than he would in front of friends. On the other hand, the individual may act
differently in front of friends than he would in front of professional acquaintances.
322. To a certain extent, this inquiry duplicates the "intrusiveness" inquiry that is part
of the newsgatherer's privilege this Article advocates. However, the two inquiries serve
different purposes. The intrusiveness inquiry requires a court to determine at the outset
whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that defendant intruded upon her
privacy. Once the court makes this determination, the question becomes whether the
defendant should be excused from liability because the defendant's behavior was aimed at
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simple observation into intrusion is a necessary step toward privacy
protection.
One final reform of the intrusion doctrine is crucial. Courts must
resist applying a newsworthiness privilege in intrusion cases.323
Courts borrowing this privilege from the private facts tort have failed
to understand that intrusion, unlike private facts, should be based on
newsgathering methods rather than publication.324 Courts may have
been lured into this error by plaintiffs (and commentators) attempting
to hold media defendants liable for intrusion by publication. This
represents either a misunderstanding of the intrusion tort or an attempt
to make an end run around the constitutional limits on the private facts
tort.
Defendants who invade a plaintiff's privacy by publishing
information about her are liable to her under the private facts tort, not
intrusion. The Restatement explicitly excludes publication from the
elements of intrusion, and indeed the lack of a publication or publicity
requirement is a critical distinction between the torts of intrusion and
private facts.325 Attempting to use the intrusion tort as a remedy for
publication-based intrusions rather than newsgathering intrusions
fundamentally changes the nature of the tort, and courts have quite
rightly closed off this avenue of attack. If an intrusion action is based
solely on the defendant's publication of private facts, the intrusion
action threatens news dissemination and is therefore subject to the full
panoply of First Amendment protections that apply in private facts
cases.
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff bases her case on
newsgathering rather than publication, newsworthiness is not a
relevant inquiry. Although tort law should consider the media's
justifications for using various newsgathering methods,
newsworthiness, a doctrine borrowed from the private facts tort, has
already proved too uncertain to provide any practical limits on media
behavior.3
26
uncovering a significant threat to the health, safety or financial well being of others and that
the defendant's conduct was no more intrusive than necessary to obtain this information.
323. See supra notes 156-246 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App.
1985); Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.YS.2d 92, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Haynik v. Zimlick,
508 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 1986); see also Walsh, supra note 30, at 1126 (arguing that the
newsworthiness analysis should not be employed in cases of newsgatherer wrongdoing
because it "obscures the simple but powerful principle that newsgatherers are not immune
from laws of general applicability').
325. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652D cmt. a.
326. Professor McClurg is more of an optimist on this score than I am. See McClurg,
supra note 25, at 1078-79.
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B. Creating a Qualified Tort Privilege to Protect Newsgathering
In addition to the doctrinal changes discussed above, courts or
legislatures should adopt a qualified privilege 27  to protect
newsgatherers whose potentially intrusive behavior serves the public
interest.328 Under this privilege, a newsgatherer should prevail in an
intrusion action if she can establish two elements. First, the
newsgatherer must show that she had probable cause to believe that
the plaintiff's conduct posed a significant threat to the health, safety, or
financial well-being of others. Second, the newsgatherer must show
that her methods were not substantially more intrusive than necessary
to obtain documentation of plaintiff's wrongdoing. Unlike current
law, this privilege would delineate a sphere of protected newsgathering
activity, thereby giving newsgatherers and their targets advance notice
of how courts will balance their competing interests.
1. To Whom Does the Privilege Apply?
The privilege this Article advocates is justified by the role of the
media in uncovering serious abuses that threaten public health and
safety. As discussed in Part VC, the media are not only watchdogs of
government. The media also play an important watchdog role in the
so-called private sector, and if they are to continue monitoring
wrongdoing in the private sector, their information gathering activities
must receive some protection.32 9 Although the institutional media
primarily fulfill this important monitoring function, it is not limited to
them. Free-lance journalists, academic researchers, public interest
organizations and others also gather information designed to uncover
serious threats to public health and safety. Thus, the privilege
advocated here should apply to anyone who performs the same type of
monitoring activities as the institutional media.
327. Courts have developed a number of qualified privileges to protect defendants
from defamation liability. The common law, for example, created a privilege as early as 1808
to protect criticism of literary, artistic, or musical works, as long as the critic presented the
facts on which his criticism was based fairly and accurately. See Carr v. Hood, 170 Eng. Rep.
983 (1808). See generally FRANKLrN & ANDERSON, supra note 72, at 221-24 (discussing
common law privileges as applied in defamation actions).
328. Although this privilege potentially could be applied to other torts besides
intrusion, I leave discussion of that issue for other commentators.
329. See Kent R. Middleton, Journalists and Tape Recorders: Does Participant
Monitoring Invade Privacy?, 2 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. W. 287, 323 (1979) (arguing that
"[m]uch activity ... which was once exclusively part of the private sector, is now so
intertwined with govemment and the public welfare that it must be subject to public scrutiny
fully as much as government activity").
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2. Probable Cause/Significant Threat
The privilege only extends protection to newsgatherers in limited
circumstances. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
intrusion, the defendant newsgatherer must establish that she is eligible
for the privilege. By placing the burden on the defendant to establish
that she is eligible for the privilege, the privilege implicitly confirms
that privacy will not automatically give way to newsgathering interests
any time the two conflict. The first element the defendant must
establish is that she had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was
engaged in behavior that posed a significant threat to the health, safety,
or well-being of others. This element is necessary to prevent
defendants from engaging in "fishing expeditions;" a defendant should
not get the benefit of the privilege if she happened fortuitously to
stumble upon evidence of plaintiff's wrongdoing.
The probable cause standard advocated here would be analogous
to the probable cause standard applied in malicious prosecution cases.
Probable cause "is a reasonable ground for belief in the guilt of the
party""33 that the newsgatherer is investigating. Probable cause is an
objective standard:33  the newsgatherer must establish the
reasonableness of her belief that the plaintiff was engaged in behavior
that posed a significant threat to public health, safety, or financial well-
being of others.332 To satisfy this standard, the newsgatherer must
present the evidence she relied upon in determining whether or not to
use intrusive newsgathering methods. This evidence will establish
probable cause if it came from a credible source or other reliable
evidence.333 Mere speculation that the plaintiff was engaged in wrong-
330. KEETON, supra note 132, § 119, at 876. I previously argued for a similar
privilege to protect reporters who use surreptitious surveillance. See Barnett, supra note 80,
nn.131-171 and accompanying text. I have since come to believe that the privilege I
advocated there was too narrow (because it applied only to surreptitious surveillance), too
broad (because it would permit reporters to use subterfuge to gain access to anyone engaged
in potentially harmful conduct), and insufficiently nuanced to provide adequate protection for
privacy and newsgathering. I also believe that the privilege I advocated there had some
serious procedural limitations. The privilege I advocate here is both more ambitious and
more workable.
331. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Masterson v. Pig 'N Whistle Corp., 326 P.2d 918, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
332. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 662 cmt. c.
333. Requiring courts and juries to make this determination would not be unduly
burdensome. The law already requires a similar determination in defamation law. A central
issue in many defamation cases is whether a media defendant printed a defamatory statement
with actual malice. "Actual malice" is a term of art-a defendant's actual malice is
established by showing knowing or reckless disregard of the falsity of the statement at issue.
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the First
Amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
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doing will not be enough to constitute probable cause.334 The probable
cause requirement will therefore deter irresponsible and unreflective
uses of intrusive newsgathering techniques and reward those
newsgatherers who act with due consideration for the privacy of their
targets.
The significant threat requirement presents a somewhat higher
obstacle to establishing the privilege. This privilege protects the
reporter only when she is engaged in gathering information about
conduct that poses a significant threat to public health, safety or
financial well-being. The privilege is deliberately narrow in scope.
By requiring that the threat to others be significant, the privilege tries
to draw a relatively clear line between uses of intrusive newsgathering
that directly serve the public interest and uses that are merely
provocative or titillating (albeit profitable). Thus, physical abuse of
the elderly in nursing homes or children in day care clearly poses a
significant threat to the health and safety of its victims. On the other
hand, while documenting the fact that telephone psychics do not have
the power to foresee the future is interesting and could save gullible
souls some money, this story hardly safeguards the public against a
significant threat to its well-being.335
Some will no doubt respond that the scope of the privilege
advocated here is too narrow because it excludes from its purview
stories that interest the public but that do not fall neatly into its
definition of "significant threat." Broadening the privilege, however,
threatens to undermine its usefulness by making it so vague as to be
meaningless as a guide to protected conduct or a bulwark against
privacy invasion.
Consider, for example, the suggestion that the law should protect
newsgathering that produces information that is "newsworthy" or "of
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."). Actual malice is established by showing that a "defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth" of the information she published. St. Amant v. Thomson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968). A defendant acts with actual malice, for example, "where a story is
fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an
unverified anonymous telephone call," or where he purposefully avoids finding out the truth.
Id. at 732; see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989). The standard I advocate here is more objective than the actual malice standard.
334. See KEEToN, supra note 132, § 119, at 876 (noting that probable cause may not
be based on "[u]nfounded suspicion and conjecture").
335. I am assuming here that relatively few individuals will fritter away enormous
sums of money on phony telepsychics, although I do not have proof of this assumption. The
analysis would obviously change if the newsgatherer could prove the contrary. Note, also,
that my analysis would not bar the media from uncovering phony telepsychics through
traditional means.
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legitimate public concem." Courts routinely apply the legitimate
public concern standard to determine whether the media's publication
of private facts is actionable,336  and some courts337  and
commentators338 apply the same standard to newsgathering cases. The
application of the legitimate public concern standard in private facts
cases gives little comfort to advocates of privacy. Due to the
vagueness of the standard, courts routinely give great deference to
media determinations that information is of public concern in private
facts cases.339 Such deference is perhaps understandable given the
strength of society's interest in avoiding judicial censorship of what
information should be published.340 But the result of this deference is
devastating to privacy, leading many to conclude that broad
interpretations of the legitimate public concern or newsworthiness
standard have effectively "decimate[d] the tort.'3 41
The legitimate public concern standard should not likewise
become a broad shield for intrusive newsgathering. The right to gather
news, while important, merits less protection than the right to
publish.3 42  Although society receives enormous benefits from the
media's newsgathering activities, the right to gather news must not be
extended so broadly that the media become a self-appointed
investigative body subject to no constitutional limits, even those to
which the police are subject. The legitimate public concern standard is
too uncertain to put any meaningful restraints on the media.
Moreover, the legitimate public concern standard fails to give advance
guidance as to what newsgathering activities are protected. It is thus
neither an effective deterrent to media intrusions nor an effective guide
to what conduct will avoid liability.
336. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 652D.
337. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text
338. See McClurg, supra note 25, at 1078-79 (arguing that in intrusion cases, courts
should consider whether the information acquired involved a "matter of legitimate public
interest").
339. See Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An
Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REv. 425, 443 n.101 (1996) (citing private
facts cases).
340. See Zimmerman, supra note 126, at 353. But cf Mintz, supra note 339, at 443
("[C]ourts cannot possibly allow the press, the largest class of defendants under [the private
facts] tort, to establish the terms of virtual immunity from liability. Such an abdication
mocks this privacy interest .... ).
341. See Kalven, supra note 159, at 336; see also Mintz, supra note 339, at 442-43.
342. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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3. Intrusiveness
The second showing that the defendant must make before being
entitled to the newsgatherer's privilege is somewhat more complicated
than the first. The defendant must establish that her investigative
methods were not significantly more intrusive than necessary to gather
credible information of her target's wrongdoing.343 Even where
intrusive newsgathering is justified by the importance of the
information sought, the extent, duration, or means used can transform
a legitimate use of intrusive newsgathering into an illegitimate
intrusion. By requiring the defendant to prove that her conduct was no
more intrusive than necessary, the intrusiveness inquiry gives a
plaintiff some degree of protection against overly aggressive intrusions
into her private life.
Because the perceived intrusiveness of defendant's conduct will
vary with the circumstances of the individual case, it is impossible to
specify the precise factors that make a defendant's conduct unduly
intrusive. It is nonetheless possible to make useful generalizations,
and as these generalizations become part of case law, they have the
potential to bring needed predictability to the application of the
newsgatherer's privilege.
In some contexts, almost any attempts to gather information
about the plaintiff will be unduly intrusive. As a general proposition,
the individual deserves greater protection from intrusions into his
home than he does from intrusions into his workplace or his activities
outside the home.3' Traditionally, the home has been "the center of
343. Professor McClurg argues that the "magnitude of the intrusion," including factors
such as its duration, extent and the means used, should be considered in determining whether
plaintiff has established an actionable intrusion. See McClurg, supra note 25, at 1063. This
Article takes a different approach, arguing instead that these are factors the defendant must
establish to obtain the benefit of the newsgatherer's privilege. As envisioned, the privilege
would only come into play after the plaintiff alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that the defendant invaded a plaintiff's protected sphere of solitude or seclusion and
that the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The privilege assumes
that even if the defendant has invaded the plaintiff's sphere of solitude or seclusion in a
manner highly offensive to a reasonable person, the defendant's conduct should nonetheless
be shielded from liability where it is aimed at obtaining documentation of serious
wrongdoing and where it is obtained in a manner that is appropriate to the magnitude of the
wrongdoing. The burden of arguing that the magnitude of the intrusion was no greater than
warranted should fall on the defendant, not the plaintiff, the target of defendant's intrusive
conduct. This difference is not merely semantic. Placing the burden on the defendant clearly
expresses a presumption in favor of privacy protection.
344. See generally Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 308. One of the goals of
Slobogin and Schumacher's empirical investigation was to determine what "types of factors
people consider in evaluating the intrusiveness" of police conduct. Id. at 732. Although the
authors were concerned with privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, their findings
confirmed that citizens tend to have the greatest expectations of privacy with regard to their
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the appropriately private sphere,'3 4 and both tort and constitutional
law have extended strong protections against intrusions into the
home.346  As a practical matter, therefore, almost any form of
information-gathering by the media that targets an individual in his
home will be unduly intrusive.
A harder question is posed by intrusions that occur outside the
home, which may be one reason why many courts have abdicated
responsibility for protecting individuals from intrusions in public
places.347  Some public places are more private than others. An
individual has little expectation of privacy while walking down a
public street, eating in a public restaurant, or shopping in a department
store, but has a great expectation of privacy while occupying a public
toilet or a public dressing room.348 Distinguishing between these two
situations is important, because the level of intrusiveness of a
defendant's information-gathering activities will vary depending on
the strength of the plaintiff's privacy interest.
More difficult distinctions arise in connection with media
intrusions into the workplace. Even here, however, it is possible to
make useful generalizations. Workplace interactions traditionally have
been characterized by a certain degree of institutional formality and
social distance.3 49 In the workplace setting, people tend to deal with
one another at arm's length; they do not expect the same level of
intimacy and trust in relationships with co-workers or employers as
they expect in relationships with family and friends.35 °
homes and their persons and tended to regard investigative activities aimed at these locations
as highly intrusive. See id. at 739. Thus, for example, the searches perceived as most
intrusive included (in descending order) a body cavity search, monitoring a target's phone for
30 days, reading a personal diary, searching a bedroom, and drawing blood from the target in
the workplace. See id.
345. RICHARD C. TuIRKINGTON ET AL., PRIVACY: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (lst ed.
1992) (citing proponents and critics of this principle).
346. Trespass law and Fourth Amendment law are noteworthy examples.
347. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
348. See TURKINGTON, supra note 345, at 270.
349. See Middleton, supra note 329 at 323. But see ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE
TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997) (observing
that many workers see work as a refuge from home life and that their most meaningful
relationships may be formed at work).
350. See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Right, Public Policy, and the Employment
Relationship, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 671, 702 (1996) (noting that an individual's expectations of
privacy are different in employment relationships than in other relationships because
"[e]mployment falls at some mid-point on the spectrum of social relationships. It is
characterized neither by the distant formality of a chance encounter with a stranger, nor by
the intimacy found between close friends or lovers."). Courts have recognized this principle
in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989). The "'operational realities of the workplace' may render
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This generalization, however, should not obscure the fact that
workers (and their employers) deserve some degree of protection from
intrusions by outsiders, including the media, at least in certain
circumstances. A distinction must be drawn between intrusions that
occur in businesses that are open to the public and businesses that are
not. Certainly businesses that are open to the public and individuals
that serve the public directly have little expectation of privacy. Indeed,
serving customers involves almost constant interactions with strangers,
who have their own private agendas and desires. As Sissela Bok has
observed, many businesses that serve the public are already subject to
monitoring by persons posing as ordinary customers.351  Restaurants
are frequented by critics and health inspectors who customarily do not
divulge their true identifies.352 In the medical profession, social
scientists routinely pose as patients to obtain valuable information
about the quality of patient care.353 Landlords may be monitored to
ensure that they do not discriminate against potential tenants, and
monitoring is likewise common in the banking and car repair
industries.
354
Even in industries where surreptitious surveillance is not so
pervasive, those who serve the public always takes a risk that
customers, patrons, clients, or patients may not be what they seem.
Given the relatively low expectation of privacy in these situations, a
reporter's conduct will almost never be unduly intrusive so long as she
merely patronizes the business as any other customer would, even
though she does not reveal the fact that she is a reporter.3
55
A different situation arises, however, when a reporter gains
access to nonpublic areas of a business. Trespass law provides a
useful analogy. A person who enters a grocery store as a customer or
even one who accompanies a customer is not a trespasser. But when
the same person wanders into a stock room or areas of the store that
are not open to the public, the person becomes liable for trespass.
entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might
be viewed as unreasonable in other contexts." Id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
717-18 (plurality opinion) (recognizing that employees may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the workplace, but noting that the "expectation of privacy must be assessed in the
context of the employment relation" including the "operational realities of the workplace")).





355. Cf. LeBel, Getting the News, supra note 17, at 1158. "What matters most in this
scenario is that my conduct would have been equally observable by someone who was not a
reporter." Id.
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Likewise, a reporter who merely observes what any other customer
could observe should not be liable for intrusion, but the reporter's
investigation may be unduly intrusive when it crosses into private
areas of a public business."' In private areas of the business, the
business and its employees expect to be free from constant scrutiny,
and this expectation merits some degree of protection.
A related factor in the determination of intrusiveness is what
means the reporter used to gain access. As argued extensively above,
photographing or recording the plaintiff is potentially more intrusive
than merely observing him. Likewise, relying on an elaborate ruse to
gain access to the plaintiff as the reporters did in Food Lion may also
increase the intrusiveness of the media's newsgathering tactics. In
assessing the intrusiveness of the means used to gather information
about the plaintiff, courts also should consider whether the reporter
reasonably could have obtained the information through less intrusive
means. This factor, however, must be applied with some degree of
sensitivity. Just because a story could have been obtained by less
intrusive means does not mean that it would be practical to do so.
Moreover, as the 20/20 example illustrates, seeing is sometimes
believing. The very same story may have much less impact or
credibility when it is printed in a newspaper than when it is captured
on tape. Thus, courts should not be overly rigid in forcing reporters to
show that the story was not obtainable through less intrusive means,
but should instead consider whether the means used contributed
significantly to the credibility or impact of the resulting story.
4. How the Privilege Works
Throughout the history of the common law, judges have created
privileges to protect important societal interests. Judges could just as
easily adopt the newgatherer's privilege advocated here as a means of
achieving an appropriate balance between privacy and newsgathering
rights. Alternatively, legislators could enact a newsgatherer's
privilege, an option that in some ways would be preferable to judicial
adoption because it would immediately reform the law for an entire
state.
Once adopted, the newsgatherer's privilege could be used to
dispose of newsgathering cases before trial in many instances. If
20/20 were sued for its story on nursing home abuses, for example,
20/20 would be able to establish, based on the Houston Chronicle's
earlier story, that it had probable cause to believe that serious abuses of
356. See generally Middleton, supra note 329, at 323.
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elderly residents were taking place in Texas nursing homes. 20/20 also
would be able to show that sending reporters into a state nursing home
with hidden cameras was not unduly intrusive in light of the gravity of
the harm and the fact that the reporters merely observed what any
other visitor could have observed. It could also show that the "less
intrusive" Houston Chronicle story had failed to gamer sufficient
attention to prompt public reform. Thus, the judge could easily grant
summary judgment in favor of 20/20 on this set of facts because, even
if the plaintiff were able to make out a prima facie case of intrusion,"'
no reasonable jury could find that 20/20's conduct was unwarranted
under the newsgatherer's privilege.
In those cases that could not be resolved before trial, the privilege
would have the salutary effect of focusing the jury's attention on the
relevant factors separating legitimate newsgathering from unwarranted
invasion of privacy. In the Food Lion case, for example, it is certainly
arguable that the story could have been obtained by less intrusive
means without a serious loss of impact or credibility.3 58 Food Lion,
therefore, would not have been an appropriate case for granting
summary judgment in favor of the media defendant ABC. By
instructing the jury to apply the newsgatherer's privilege, however, the
jury's attention would remain focused on the relevant factors
separating legitimate newsgathering from actionable intrusion, and
perhaps the decision would be made on a more reasoned and less
emotional basis.
Not every media defendant should get the benefit of the privilege.
Where no reasonable juror could conclude that a defendant had
established entitlement to the privilege, the judge should refuse to give
the defendant the benefit of the privilege at trial. If a media defendant
obtained access to a private residence under false pretenses in order to
secretly film the plaintiff's personal idiosyncrasies, or if the defendant
posed as a college student as part of an expos6 of the most common
pick-up lines in a bar, no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs'
activities posed a significant threat to the public's health, safety, or
financial well-being. Thus, assuming these plaintiffs were able to
establish a prima facie case of intrusion, the case should go the jury,
who would then decide whether or not the defendant invaded the
plaintiff's privacy. In this situation, the defendant newsgatherer would
get the same treatment as any other litigant.
357. The privilege advocated here also could be applied when the media (or nonmedia
defendants serving the same function) are sued for other torts (for example, trespass,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, etc.) based on their newsgathering conduct.
358. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Both the right to privacy and the right to gather news are
important social values. When these two values collide, one may only
be expanded at the expense of the other.
This Article urges tort law (particularly the tort of intrusion) to
strike a new balance between privacy and newsgathering. Striking this
balance is no easy task. It requires courts to make fine distinctions
between legitimate newsgathering and unwarranted invasions of
privacy, while also requiring sensitivity to the fragility of the social
consensus supporting increased privacy protection and the economic
realities of the media business.
Tort law, at least in theory, is capable of this degree of sensitivity.
After all, tort law routinely sorts out such nebulous issues as the value
of pain and suffering, the authenticity of emotional distress, and the
"reasonableness" of a defendant's behavior. Yet tort law largely has
failed to do more than pay lip service to privacy when it conflicts with
First Amendment values. Moreover, the one tort that is designed
specifically for this purpose, intrusion, has been undercut by crabbed
doctrinal interpretations of its scope and judicial insensitivity to the
interests it protects, forcing both plaintiffs and defendants to engage in
a dangerous guessing game about the breadth of the gap between the
law in the books (which ostensibly protects privacy) and the law in
action (which does not).
If the intrusion tort is to shield plaintiffs from prying, spying, and
lying by the media, courts must interpret the tort more expansively.
Courts must acknowledge that citizens are entitled to a modicum of
privacy even in public places, and must modernize the intrusion tort to
respond to the threat posed by high-tech surveillance methods.
Doctrinal reform is only a preliminary step toward balancing privacy
and newsgathering.
The second step toward meaningful reform is the adoption of the
qualified newsgatherer's privilege advocated by this article. Adoption
of the privilege would benefit both the media and the individuals
whose privacy they violate. This privilege would protect
newsgatherers who uncover threats to public health, safety, or financial
well-being, at least where their newsgathering methods are-,not
substantially more intrusive than necessary. By clearly delineating a
sphere of protected newsgathering activity, the privilege would send a
clear message to media lawyers and their clients about how to avoid
liability and would therefore deter the most egregious forms of
intrusive newsgathering.
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The privilege would also lead to more rational and more
predictable decisions in the newsgathering area by focusing analysis
on the relevant factors separating unwarranted media intrusions from
legitimate newsgathering. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
privilege would mediate between society's simultaneous yet
conflicting commitments to privacy and disclosure.
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